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GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELIGION
Caroline Mala Corbin*
ABSTRACT
Picture a county clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license to an LGBT
couple or a city bus driver who insists on wearing a hijab. The clerk is fired
for failing to fulfill job responsibilities and the bus driver for violating official
dress codes. Both claim that their termination violates the First Amendment
speech and religion clauses.
There is a well-developed First Amendment government employee speech
jurisprudence. Less developed is the doctrine and literature for First
Amendment government employee religion. The existing Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence usually does not specifically account for the
government employee context. This Article attempts to fill that gap by
developing a government employee religion doctrine based on the existing
government employee speech doctrine.
Part I summarizes government employee speech doctrine. Part II imagines
a parallel government employee religion doctrine and applies it to the
opening hypotheticals. It concludes that government employees who are
religiously opposed to an aspect of their job would lose their religion claims
for multiple reasons. In contrast, employees who wish to wear religious garb
have much stronger claims. Part III addresses two concerns with my
proposed government employee religion doctrine. One criticism is that
government employee speech doctrine is too flawed to serve as a model.
Another is that speech and religion are too dissimilar to base one on the
other.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a county clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license to an LGBT
couple or a police officer who refuses to arrest disruptive protesters. Or
picture a city bus driver who insists on wearing a yarmulke or a hijab. The
former are fired for failing to fulfill job responsibilities, and the latter for
violating official dress codes. All claim that their termination violates the
First Amendment speech and religion clauses.
These examples are not entirely hypothetical.' Most famously, Kim Davis,
a county clerk in Kentucky, stopped issuing marriage licenses because
signing licenses for same-sex couples would compromise her Christian
beliefs.2 At one point Davis was jailed for defying a court order that she
perform the duties of her office.3 The Governor of Kentucky came to her
rescue with an executive order changing the forms, which are now issued
without an authorizing signature from the county clerk.' This case may be a
1. There are generally three types of government employee religion claims. One, the
government employee refuses to perform part of their official duties because it clashes with their
religious faith. See, e.g., Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2003) (Baptist
state police officer religiously opposed to gambling who refused assignment as Gaming
Commission Agent); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir.
2000) (Pentecostal nurse in labor and delivery room who refused to assist with emergency
surgeries she considered abortion); Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir.
1991) (Roman Catholic FBI agent who refused on religious grounds to investigate vandalism by
pacifist groups at military recruiting stations); Haringv. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1174-75
(D.D.C. 1979) (IRS agent who refused on religious grounds to process tax exempt status for
organizations that promote abortion and LGBT rights); cases cited infra note 47. Two, the
government employee feels religiously compelled to wear something-a beard, a headcovering,
a cross that is barred by uniform or dress rules. See cases cited infra note 48. Three, the
government employee needs time off for religious observance, such as a Sabbath day. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000) (U.S. Post Office
mail carrier sought Sabbath day off); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir.
1996) (California Plant Inspector sought Sabbath off).
2. Although Kim Davis inspired this Article, it is not ultimately about Kim Davis herself
Kim Davis was an elected official, and I am focusing on government employees who are not
directly chosen by the electorate. Erik Ortiz, Gabe Gutierrez & Daniella Silva, Kim Davis,
Kentucky Clerk, Held in Contempt and Ordered to Jail, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 3, 2015, 5:43 PM),
https://www.nbenews.com/news/us-news/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-held-contempt-court-
n421126.
3. Id.
4. Sandhya Somashekhar, Kentucky Governor Alters Marriage Licenses to Accommodate
Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/12/22/kentucky-govemor-alters-
marriage-licenses-to-accommodate-opponents-of-same-sex-
marriage/?utmterm=.58652835cel3 ("The order removes a requirement that county clerks'
names appear on marriage licenses issued by their offices."). Because there was uncertainty over
whether the Governor has the legal authority to make this change, the Kentucky legislature passed
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harbinger of more to come, as government employees feel empowered to
insist on living their lives and doing their jobs in complete conformity with
their religious beliefs.
There is a well-developed First Amendment government employee speech
doctrine, and literature for that matter. Less developed is First Amendment
government employee religion jurisprudence. Existing Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence usually does not specifically account for the government
employee context. This Article attempts to fill that gap by imagining what
government employee religion doctrine informed by government employee
speech doctrine would look like. It focuses particularly on the religious
refusal cases, where a public employee's faith prevents them from executing
a job responsibility,' but it also considers other kinds of clashes between
religious public employees and government requirements.
Despite widespread scholarly disapproval of the existing government
employee speech doctrine,6 the Article takes it as a given for two reasons.
First, as discussed in Part III, the main criticism does not apply in the religion
context. Second, this Article's goal is not to reconceive government
employee speech doctrine, but to construct a government employee religion
doctrine based on current law, with conclusions that can be immediately
adopted. And while the Article focuses on constitutional religious liberty
claims, it also provides guidance to statutory religious liberty ones, such as
those brought under a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act.7
Part I summarizes government employee speech doctrine, which consists
of a three-step inquiry. In the first step, government employee speech that is
made pursuant to official duties is screened out; it is considered government
speech and not covered by the Free Speech Clause. The second step asks
whether the speech is on a matter of public concern. If not, it too is
a bill codifying it. Dani Kass, Kentucky Governor Signs Bill Nixing Clerk Names on Marriage
License, LAW360.cOM (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/784403/ky-gov-signs-
bill-nixing-clerk-names-on-marriage-licenses.
5. Although "employee" is singular and "their" is plural, I adopt it as a gender-neutral
substitute for "his or her." See, e.g., Jeff Guo, Sorry, Grammar Nerds. The Singular 'They' Has
Been Declared Word of the Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/08/donald-trump-may-win-this-
years-word-of-the-year/ (reporting the widespread acceptance of the singular "they").
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (detailing scholarly complaints about government
employee speech doctrine, especially after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
7. Laws such as Mississippi's H.B. 1523 "Protecting Freedom of Conscience from
Government Discrimination Act," MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-1 (2017), which explicitly grant
public employees the right to "seek recusal from authorizing or licensing lawful marriages based
upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief," id. § 11-62-5(8)(a), are
beyond the scope of this Article, which addresses claims of government employees whose beliefs
have not been accommodated.
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unprotected. If the government employee's speech passes those two threshold
inquiries, then the value of the speech is balanced against the government's
interest in a well-functioning workplace.
Part II imagines what a parallel government employee religion doctrine
would look like and applies it to the opening hypotheticals. It concludes that
government employees who are religiously opposed to an aspect of their job
would lose their religion claims for multiple reasons. In contrast, employees
who wish to wear religious garb have much stronger claims. Part II also
explains why formulating a constitutional doctrine for public employee
religious liberty claims is important even in an age of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA): Free Exercise Clause claims will continue despite
the growing use of RFRA (or its state counterparts), and in any event the
concerns that shape the constitutional claims should inform the statutory
ones.
Part III addresses two criticisms of my proposed approach to government
employee religion. One is that it is a mistake to rely on the highly flawed
government employee speech doctrine. Much scholarly critique has been
levied against this doctrine. In particular, by failing to protect employees who
report wrongdoing in the course of their job, the pursuant to official duties
test discourages whistleblowing and consequently undermines the public's
ability to hold the government accountable for its misconduct. Although a
valid concern, it does not arise with government employees practicing their
religion.
Another argument against basing public employee religion claims on
public employee speech claims is that religion and speech are too dissimilar.
Protecting speech both furthers the individual autonomy of the speaker as
well as ensures a free flow of information to the public. Individual religious
practice, however, lacks speech's dual character and promotes only
individual autonomy. This difference explains why the whistleblower
critique does not reach government employee religion. Might it also be why
government employee speech is an inappropriate model? Part III considers
this argument, along with a second, albeit less common, criticism of
government employee speech doctrine: its failure to adequately incorporate
the individual autonomy justification for speech, and now, perhaps, for
religion.
I. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE
At one time, the Free Speech Clause did not extend to government
employees. Justice Homes famously summarized this approach as: "[A
policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
49:1193] 1197
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constitutional right to be a policeman."' While the Holmes approach no
longer prevails,9 government employees are not protected from their
government-employer to the same extent they are protected from their
government-sovereign. In other words, the government may discipline its
employees for their speech in a way it cannot punish regular citizens. That
does not mean that the government has carte blanche: Terminating an
employee for their speech might still violate the Free Speech Clause.o
More specifically, government employee speech claims are currently
subject to a three-step test. At each step, certain speech claims are winnowed
out. First, no claim lies for speech made pursuant to the government
employee's official duties. Second, government employee speech about
purely personal matters as opposed to matters of public concern is not
protected by the Free Speech Clause. Third, even if the government
employee's speech was not made as part of their job and concerned a public
matter, it is still ultimately unprotected if it unduly disrupts the workplace.
Each of these steps is explained in more detail below.
A. Speech Pursuant to Official Duties Threshold
Government employee speech that is made fulfilling one's job
responsibilities is not protected by the Free Speech Clause. This limit was
announced in 2006 by Garcetti v. Ceballos." Richard Ceballos was a deputy
district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office 2 and
his official duties included advising his superiors on upcoming cases. 3 In one
disposition memorandum, Ceballos criticized an affidavit used to procure a
search warrant and recommended dismissal of the case.' 4 His supervisors
disagreed, and following a heated discussion, Ceballos suffered various
adverse employment consequences." The Supreme Court dismissed his
subsequent free speech claim, writing, "We hold that when public employees
8. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
9. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 227 (2003) ("Our precedents
firmly reject[] Justice Holmes' famous dictum .... ).
10. See supra note 5 (discussing singular use of "they" and "them").
11. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
12. Id at 413.
13. See id. at 421.
14. For example, Ceballos questioned "the affidavit's statement that tire tracks led from a
stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the warrant. His doubts arose from his conclusion
that the roadway's composition in some places made it difficult or impossible to leave visible tire
tracks." Id. at 414.
15. Id. at 415-16.
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make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline."16
The decision suggests, although it does not explicitly state, that public
employee speech pursuant to official duties is government speech." For
example, the Court justifies its holding as "simply reflect[ing] the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created."" Indeed, Justice Souter complains in dissent that "[t]he majority
accepts the fallacy . . . that any statement made within the scope of public
employment is (or should be treated as) the government's own speech."19
Thus, the Supreme Court imports the dichotomy between private speech
and government speech into the government employee context.20 The Court
assumes that Ceballos could either be acting as a private citizen or acting as
the government, but not both.2 ' If public employees like Ceballos are
speaking outside their job responsibilities, then that speech is private speech
that may be covered. If, however, the public employees are speaking pursuant
16. Id. at 421.
17. Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government
Workplace, 94 N.C. L. REV. 601, 636 (2016) ("No Supreme Court case has ever directly applied
the government speech doctrine to deny a public employee's First Amendment claim, although
the majority opinion in Garcetti appears to have been influenced by it." (footnote omitted)); Helen
Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control oflts Workers' Speech to
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DuKE L.J. 1, 12 (2009) (noting that the Garcetti majority "created
a bright-line rule that treats public employees' speech delivered pursuant to their official duties
as the government's own speech that is, speech that the government has bought with a salary
and thus may control free from First Amendment scrutiny"); Kermit Roosevelt III, Not As Bad
As You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 631, 635 (2012)
("The Court did not give an elaborate explanation for why speech produced pursuant to official
duties should be unprotected. It gestured in two directions. First, it suggested that speech produced
pursuant to official duties was in some sense government speech.").
18. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. Moreover, the supporting quotation directly references
government speech: "[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech."); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2254 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting) ("Under our First Amendment cases, the distinction between government
speech and private speech is critical."); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 607 (2008) ("We generally characterize
speech as either private or governmental, and this dichotomy is embedded in First Amendment
jurisprudence.").
21. For a critique of this dichotomy, see generally Corbin, supra note 20.
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to their official work duties, then that speech is government speech.2 2
Government speech, of course, does not trigger the Free Speech Clause.2 3
Rather, free speech is meant to protect private individuals from the
government.
In sum, the first threshold inquiry is whether the public employee is
speaking pursuant to their official duties. If so, then that speech is essentially
the government's, and as government speech the Free Speech Clause does
not reach it.
B. Matter ofPublic Concern Threshold
Although public employee speech pursuant to official duties is
automatically unprotected, public employee speech outside official duties is
not automatically protected. Instead, it must satisfy the second threshold and
amount to "speech on a matter of public interest." "[A] public employee's
speech is entitled to [First Amendment protection] only when the employee
speaks 'as a citizen upon matters of public concern' rather than 'as an
employee upon matters only of personal interest."' 24
What counts as speech on a matter of public concern is not well-defined.25
In its most recent government employee speech case, the Supreme Court held
that "[s]peech involves matters of public concern when it can be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public." 26 The local
school board's allocation of funds is a matter of public interest,27 as is the
22. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 ("When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid
to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee.").
23. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245-46 ("[G]ovemment statements ... do not normally trigger
the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas."); see also Pleasant
Grove City, 555 U.S. at 469 ("[G]ovemment speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause.").
24. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
25. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (acknowledging that "the boundaries of the
public concern test are not well defined").
26. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (quotations omitted).
27. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968) ("[T]he question [of] whether a
school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern . . . .").
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issue of whether a government employer pressured his staff to participate in
a political campaign.2 8 Snarky criticism of a sitting President also qualifies.2 9
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court made clear in Connick v. Myers,
personal grievances concerning the workplace are not matters of public
interest, even if that workplace is a government office. In Connick, Assistant
District Attorney Sheila Myers, who strongly opposed her proposed
transfer,30 prepared a questionnaire for her coworkers. 3 ' The Court held that
the questions regarding the office transfer policy, office morale, and the need
for a grievance committee were not matters of public concern but "mere
extensions of Myers's dispute over her transfer to another section,"3 2 and "an
attempt to turn [her] displeasure [with her transfer] into a cause cel6bre." 33
Consequently, those questions did not trigger free speech protection.34
In sum, the second threshold question is whether the government
employee's speech was on a matter of public interest. If not, then it does not
merit Free Speech Clause protection.
C. Undue Disruption
If the government employee's speech survives the two threshold inquiries,
then its free speech value will be weighed against its disruptiveness to the
government workplace. The more valuable the speech, the more workplace
upheaval it may create before losing protection.35 Still, there is a limit, and
even speech on important public affairs will not be protected if it causes too
much disruption. "The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the
28. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) ("[W]e believe it apparent that the issue of
whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of
interest to the community .... ).
29. After hearing of an assassination attempt on President Reagan, a young clerk working
in a police station remarked, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987). The Supreme Court held that the comment was speech on a matter of
public concern. Id. at 386-87.
30. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
31. Id. at 141.
32. Id. at 148.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 146 ("[I]f Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting
speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.").
35. Connick, 461 U.S. at 164 n.4 ("The degree to which speech is of interest to the public
may be relevant in determining whether a public employer may constitutionally be required to
tolerate some degree of disruption resulting from its utterance."); see also Lane v. Franks, 134
S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) ("[A] stronger showing ... may be necessary if the employee's speech
more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.").
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government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public."3 6
The disruption may take different forms. The government employee's
speech may interfere with a supervisor's ability to supervise or may destroy
necessary working relationships.37 The challenged speech may make it
impossible for the government employee to continue performing their job.38
Or, the government employee's speech may bring serious disrepute to the
government department, as when a police officer sold videos of himself
masturbating in police uniform.39
This balancing of free speech and government employer interests, known
as Pickering balancing, first took place in Pickering v. Board ofEducation.40
Marvin L. Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the local newspaper
blasting the school board's handling of school funds.4 ' After the school board
fired Pickering, he brought-and won-a free speech claim.4 2 According to
the Supreme Court, Pickering's views on how the school spent public dollars
was a topic of public concern, 43 and one for which "free and open debate is
vital." 4 4 Moreover, his letter to the editor did not disrupt his school in any
significant way.45 Accordingly, the balance favored free speech protection.
Under current doctrine, then, in order for a public employee's speech to
be protected by the Free Speech Clause, three things must be true. One, the
speech was not made pursuant to the employee's work responsibilities. Two,
the speech is on a matter of public concern. Three, the free speech value
outweighs any disruption to the smooth functioning of the public employee's
workplace.
36. Id. at 150; see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
37. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) ("We have previously recognized as
pertinent considerations whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among
co-workers .... ).
38. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (finding a public
school teacher's speech protected in part because it was "neither shown nor can be presumed to
have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally").
39. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78, 84 (2004) (per curiam) ("The speech in
question was detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.").
40. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
41. Id. at 564.
42. Id. at 564-65.
43. Id. at 571 ("[T]he question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter
of legitimate public concern . . . .").
44. Id. at 571-72 ("On such a question free and open debate is vital to informed decision-
making by the electorate.").
45. Id. at 571-73.
49:1193] GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELIGION 1203
II. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELIGION DOCTRINE
This Part explores what a government employee religion doctrine modeled
on the government employment employee speech doctrine would look like,
and applies it to the opening hypotheticals. It focuses on the religious claims
brought by government employees who object to some part of their work
assignment, specifically a county clerk who does not want to issue marriage
certificates to same-sex couples,46 as well as a police officer conscientiously
opposed to protecting abortion clinics.47 It also considers other religious
challenges, such as claims by government employees battling dress codes.4 8
In all cases, the employees would argue that they are entitled to a religious
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause.
Of course, government employee religion claims do not arise in a vacuum.
There is an existing Free Exercise Clause doctrine. Following Employment
Division, Department ofHuman Resources of Oregon v. Smith, laws that are
neutral and generally applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.4 9
Therefore, government employees have no constitutional religious liberty
claim against job requirements that can be considered neutral (do not target
religion) and generally applicable (apply across the board). 0 Government
employees challenging laws that are not neutral and generally applicable,
such as a ban on religious garb for public school teachers," are entitled to a
46. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (county clerk Kim
Davis who refused on religious grounds to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples); Slater v.
Douglas County, 743 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1190 (D. Or. 2010) (county clerk religiously opposed to
same-sex unions refused to handle domestic partnership registrations).
47. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (Roman
Catholic police officer religiously opposed to guarding abortion clinic); Parrott v. District of
Columbia, Civ. A. No. 91-0049, 1991 WL 126020, at *2 (D.D.C. June 25, 1991) (police officer
unwilling for religious reasons to arrest anti-abortion demonstrators).
48. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (Muslim police officers challenging police department's no-beard policy);
Lewis v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Muslim bus driver
challenging regulation barring her khimar headcovering); Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28,
268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (public school teacher challenging law barring her
from wearing cross necklace while teaching).
49. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
50. They may, however, have a Title VII employment discrimination claim. See infra notes
218-19 and accompanying text. They may also have claims under the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA") or a state counterpart. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). Although Title
VII is outside the scope of this paper, the RFRA claim is addressed in Part II.B.2.
51. See, e.g., Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (challenging "Garb Statute," a Pennsylvania
law prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious dress or emblems while in teaching
in school).
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Free Exercise Clause exemption if the law (a) imposes a substantial burden
on their religious exercise and (b) fails strict scrutiny.5 2
However, this existing doctrine does not directly address the fact that the
government employees bringing religious liberty claims are not only citizens
for whom the government is their sovereign, but also employees for whom
the government is their boss. To the extent that lower courts have addressed
the government employee aspect of religion claims that survive the Smith
threshold,53 they have modified the free exercise doctrine in one of two ways.
Either they apply intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny to non-
neutral laws that impose a substantial religious burden,5 4 or they adopt the
government employee speech doctrine," as this Part explores doing. The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed government employee religion.
A. The Government Employee Religion Doctrine
A government employee religion doctrine that parallels the government
employee speech doctrine would incorporate its three-step inquiry. This
proposed approach does not supplant existing Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. The initial neutral and generally applicable inquiry remains.
However, in determining whether there is a substantial religious burden on
an objecting government employee, courts would start by asking whether the
religious conduct was pursuant to official duties. If not, then in place of the
two questions of strict scrutiny (which assumes a purely private objector),
52. This describes the Sherbert v. Verner test, which was the free exercise test before Smith.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Smith added a threshold inquiry about neutrality and
general applicability that screened out free exercise claims regardless of the burden on religious
exercise in a way reminiscent of Garcetti, which added a threshold inquiry about official duties
that screened out free speech claims regardless of the value of the speech.
53. If the government employee is challenging a law that is neutral and generally applicable,
then, as Smith dictates, the Free Exercise Clause claim fails and there is no need to continue.
54. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 366 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) ("While Smith and Lukumi speak in terms of strict scrutiny when
discussing the requirements for making distinctions between religious and secular exemptions,
we will assume that an intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this case arose in the public
employment context and since the Department's actions cannot survive even that level of
scrutiny." (citation omitted)).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Although the free
exercise of religion is certainly a fundamental constitutional right, we believe that the Supreme
Court might well adopt, for free exercise cases that arise in the context of public employment, an
analysis like the one enunciated in Pickering v. Board of Education. That case dealt with free
speech rather than the free exercise of religion, but because the analogy is such a close one, and
because we see no essential relevant differences between those rights, we shall endeavor to apply
the principles of Pickering to the case at hand." (citation omitted)).
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would be the next two questions of government employee speech (which
takes into account that the objector is a public employee).56 Thus, for
government actions that fail Smith's "neutral and generally applicable" test,
the first step is deciding whether the public employee's conduct was pursuant
to official duties. The second step is examining whether it was on a matter of
public concern. The third step would balance the free exercise value of the
religious conduct against the effects it has on the governmental workplace.
While the first step reveals that the government's interests extend beyond an
efficient workplace, for speech as well as religion, the second uncovers some
fissures in the speech/religion analogy.
1. Speech Pursuant to Official Duties Threshold
Since Garcetti, the first threshold question in government employee
speech doctrine is whether the employee was speaking pursuant to their
official duties." If so, then the speech is deemed the government's, and no
free speech protection is available." The Free Speech Clause, after all,
protects private speech, not government speech.
In a parallel government employee religion doctrine, then, the first (post-
Smith) threshold question would be whether the employee's religious activity
was pursuant to their official duties. If so, then the action should be
considered the government's own, with no free exercise protection available.
Just as the Constitution does not protect government speech, it does not
protect government religion.
In fact, if the religious conduct was government religious conduct, then
two results follow. First, as explained, it is not protected by the First
Amendment, which protects private actors, not state actors. Second, as state
action, the conduct might be affirmatively barred by the Constitution.
Notably, even if not forbidden by the Constitution, the government religion
is still not protected by the Constitution.
a. If Pursuant to Official Duties, then State Action Not Protected by
First Amendment
Was the public employees' conduct in the opening hypotheticals pursuant
to their official duties? The line between pursuant to and not pursuant to
56. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) ("When a citizen enters government
service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.").
57. Id. at 421.
58. Id. at 421-22.
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official duties is not always clear-cut, and Supreme Court guidance is
limited.5 9 In the speech context, the Court has held that the "[t]he proper
inquiry is a practical one" 60 that asks whether the speech "owes its existence
to a public employee's professional responsibilities." 6 ' In their analyses,
courts have considered a range of factors, such as where the speech occurred
and whether the speech was part and parcel of an employee's work duties. 62
Arguably, even if a bus driver wears his yarmulke or her hijab while
fulfilling bus-driving duties, wearing a particular religious garb is itself not
part of anyone's job responsibilities; it is incident to the person, not the job.
Their religious conduct does not owe its existence to their government
position. Consequently, though not indisputably,63 the religious garb claims
likely survive this first threshold inquiry.
In contrast, assigned job responsibilities are the quintessential example of
activities that are pursuant to official duties. Actually, they aren't just
pursuant to official duties, they are official duties. Thus, when a government
employee refuses to perform one of their official duties, whether it be issuing
marriage licenses for a county clerk or protecting an abortion clinic for a
police officer, they should have no free speech or free exercise claim. 64 That
conduct is government conduct and is not protected by the Constitution. On
that basis alone, their claims should fail.
59. Id. at 424 (declining "to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope
of an employee's duties").
60. Id.
61. Id. at 421.
62. See, e.g., Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Although no one
contextual factor is dispositive, we believe several non-exclusive factors, gleaned from the case
law, are instructive: whether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the speech in
question; the subject matter of the speech; whether the speech was made up the chain of
command; whether the employee spoke at her place of employment; whether the speech gave
objective observers the impression that the employee represented the employer when she spoke
(lending it 'official significance'); whether the employee's speech derived from special
knowledge obtained during the course of her employment; and whether there is a so-called citizen
analogue to the speech." (quotation and citations omitted)).
63. Again, the line between pursuant to and not pursuant to official duties can be fuzzy, and
it is not the purpose of this Article to demarcate that line.
64. One can rephrase Garcetti's "[w]hen he went to work and performed the tasks he was
paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee" into "[w]hen he went to work and
[refused to perform] the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government employee."
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
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b. If Pursuant to Official Duties, then State Action Triggering
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause
As it happens, their religious refusal might also violate the Constitution,
which places particular limits on government action. As a result, if the
challenged conduct is pursuant to work duties, not only does the Constitution
not protect the conduct, but it may affirmatively bar it. It is, after all, state
action. Indeed, a government official "acting in his official capacity
or . . . exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law" 65 is the
paradigmatic example of a state actor.66
i) Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause, for example, prohibits the government from
favoring or endorsing religion via its speech or conduct. 67 In the speech
context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 68 The same holds true
for the distinction between government religious conduct (forbidden) and
private religious conduct (protected).
Even before Garcetti, Establishment Clause concerns featured
prominently in lower court decisions rejecting government employee
claims. 69 For example, the Free Exercise Clause claim of a government social
worker fired for praying with prison inmates was rejected on Establishment
65. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988) ("[G]enerally, a public employee acts under
color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities
pursuant to state law."); see also MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS &
DEFENSES § 5.10, at 5-82 (2017) ("Most decisions tend to treat the color-of-state-law and state
action requirements as one and the same.").
66. See, e.g., West, 487 U.S. at 49 ("[S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the
defendant a state actor." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); John Dorsett Niles, Lauren E.
Tribble & Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Making Sense ofState Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 908
(2011) ("Government actors acting in a public capacity are the prototypical state actors.").
67. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (noting that under the Establishment
Clause "the State may not favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or one
religion over others").
68. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (emphasis omitted) (citation
omitted).
69. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994) (rebuffing
public school biology teacher's claim that forbidding him from discussing his faith with his
students at school infringed his freedom of expression).
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Clause grounds,70 as were the claims of a sign language interpreter and nurse
who both integrated religion into their treatment of clients.
Recent Supreme Court decisions render the Establishment Clause a
shadow of its former separation-of-church-and-state self.72 Still, even today,
it would violate the Establishment Clause for a county office to announce that
it would not grant licenses to same-sex couples on the ground that such unions
conflicted with "God's moral law." 73
However, some have argued that it does not violate the Establishment
Clause to excuse a religious county clerk from issuing licenses if another
clerk from the office does.74 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed,
70. According to the district court, "[E]vidence suggests that, although plaintiff did not
overtly coerce inmates into accepting religious counseling, he suggested to at least some inmates
that treatment by spiritual means was the preferred method of treatment." Spratt v. Kent County,
621 F. Supp. 594, 601 (W.D. Mich. 1985). The court concluded, "The County is not required to
let plaintiff speak on religious issues if that speech violates the establishment clause." Id at 601.
71. Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[B]oth [nurse
consultant] Knight and [sign language interpreter] Quental promoted religious messages while
working with clients on state business, raising a legitimate Establishment Clause
concern.... Knight and Quental may not share their religious beliefs with clients while
conducting state business.").
72. For example, the Supreme Court recently upheld a government practice of starting its
town meeting with prayers even though almost all the prayers were Christian. Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014). For criticism of this decision, see generally Alan
Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia: The Supreme Court's Blindness to Religious Liberty and
Religious Equality Values in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 371 (2014). The
Supreme Court has also held that direct government funding of churches, formerly verboten, did
not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2029 (2017).
73. Mike Wynn & Chris Kenning, Ky. Clerk's Office Will Issue Marriage Licenses Friday-
Without the Clerk, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/03/rowan-county-ky-court-clerk-
marriage-licenses-gays/71635794/ (quoting Kim Davis on why she refused to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples). In Kim Davis's case, the district court found that her refusal to let
the county clerk's office issue any same-sex marriage licenses violated the Establishment Clause
as "a policy that promotes her own religious convictions at the expenses of others." Miller v.
Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 937 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
74. Because the Establishment Clause also bars exemptions that impose significant third-
party harms, see, for example, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787-88
(2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Yet neither may that [religious] exercise unduly restrict other
persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests . . . ."), this argument assumes no
serious material or dignitary harms to the LGBT couple seeking a license. Kent Greenawalt,
Granting Exemptions from Legal Duties: When Are They Warranted and What Is the Place of
Religion?, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 89, 113 (2016) ("If [a county clerk] feels she cannot
perform such a marriage, and someone else can do so with no inconvenience or embarrassment
for the couple, and with little or no inconvenience within the office, why not grant her that
privilege either by law or by supervisor discretion?"); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial
Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw.
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there is "play in the joints" between the two religion clauses: The government
may grant religious accommodations not required by the Free Exercise
Clause without violating the Establishment Clause." In other words, the
Constitution allows the state to make it easier for people to live according to
their conscience, even to the extent of granting an exemption from legal
obligations others must obey. Otherwise, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, both laws that mandate religious
exemptions, would violate the Constitution.7 6 Might not the long history of
permissive religious exemptions in this country suggest that accommodating
these religious refusals is constitutional?77
Yet the Supreme Court decisions announcing "play in the joints" were not
addressing government employees. In order for the religious refusal
accommodation to comply with the Establishment Clause, the individual
government employee must be distinct from the office they fill, so that their
conduct is not attributable to the state. In that case, the government allowing
employees to practice their religion does not mean the government itself is
practicing religion. However, Garcetti requires exactly this conflation if the
religious conduct is pursuant to official duties. Because the clerk's
performance of her job responsibilities, or her refusal to perform them, is
J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 318, 340 (2010) ("[U]nder the proposed exemption a religious objector may
step aside only if another willing clerk can perform the service.").
75. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) ("Our decisions recognize that 'there is
room for play in the joints' between the Clauses, some space for legislative action neither
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause." (citation
omitted)); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) ("These two Clauses, the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that 'there
is room for play in the joints' between them." (citation omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724-25 (holding that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which allows federal and state prisoners to seek religious
accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA, does not violate the
Establishment Clause). Of course, not all exemptions are constitutional. A Connecticut statute
which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their
Sabbath, violated the Establishment Clause in part because it favored Sabbath observances over
other religious observances. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985). A
similar problem would arise if a state granted exemptions to religious observers opposed to same-
sex marriage but not other religious beliefs. Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 716
(S.D. Miss. 2016) (holding that Mississippi's H.B. 1523, which requires exemptions for
government employees who believe that marriage should be limited to one man and one woman,
violated the Establishment Clause by "establish[ing] an official preference for certain religious
beliefs over others").
77. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 74, at 321 ("This Article argues that government
employees who have religious objections should be permitted to step aside from facilitating same-
sex marriages when it poses no hardship for same-sex couples.").
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pursuant to official duties, the government employee doctrine dictates that
the refusal is a government refusal.
Perhaps, though, the failure to execute official duties should not be
equated to the execution of official duties. The argument cannot work as a
general matter: Government omissions may violate the Establishment Clause
as much as commissions if the result favors or endorses one religion over
others. Rather, perhaps the conflation of government employee conduct and
government conduct disappears when the employee does not act and does not
interact with the public. A publicly employed teacher or social worker or
nurse is the government when they pray with those in their care: To students
or clients or patients who interact with them, they are the face of the
government. But might these employees retain some of their status as private
actor vs. state actor if another government employee acts in their stead?
Perhaps, especially if the county clerk's office continues to grant licenses
without the public ever learning about the accommodations for some
employees within it." Or perhaps not. In rejecting the claim that Kim Davis
was acting as a private citizen, the district court noted that private citizens
lack authority to issue marriage licenses.79 In other words, her refusal remains
pursuant to official duties because it still ultimately involves a county clerk's
action with regard to her official responsibilities. 0
ii) Equal Protection Clause
Notably, the government's actions are constrained not just by the
Establishment Clause, but by the Equal Protection Clause as well. The Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the government from discriminating on the basis
of race, sex, and after United States v. Windsor" and Obergefell v. Hodges,82
78. Once the public is made aware that a particular person refuses to fulfill their job, it is
harder to argue for a disjunction between the private person and their official role. Of course, the
employee and the state need not be one and the same in order to implicate the Constitution. It is
not just state religious practice that violates the Establishment Clause; state-sponsored private
religious practice may also violate it. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
317 (2000) (district's policy of permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer before football
games violates Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (benediction
by private rabbi invited by school to speak at school graduation violated Establishment Clause).
79. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 942 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (asking whether Kim Davis
was acting as a citizen and answering, "[t]he logical answer to this question is no, as the average
citizen has no authority to issue marriage licenses").
80. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). To rephrase Garcetti: "When he
went to work and [refused to perform] the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a
government employee." Id.
81. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).
82. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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sexual orientation.83 Windsor and Obergefell, which struck down marriage
bans as based on illegitimate animus, never pinpoint what level of equal
protection scrutiny applies to laws that disadvantage gays and lesbians.84
Most agree, however, that the Supreme Court conducted some kind of
heightened review." Had it been rational, the Court would have accepted
rather than rejected the government's proffered justification.8 6 Post- Windsor
and Obergefell, courts tend to apply heightened scrutiny to laws that classify
based on sexual orientation. 7 Consequently, discrimination by the state,
83. In striking down the federal government's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages, the
Supreme Court held that "DOMA [the Defense of Marriage Act] seeks to injure the very class
New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic . . . equal protection principles applicable
to the Federal Government." Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; see also id. at 2694 ("DOMA's principal
effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal
purpose is to impose inequality .... ). In holding that state same-sex marriage bans were
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted, "The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part
of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment's
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws." Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602; see also id. at 2604
("It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be
further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality.").
84. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power ofDignity, 84 FORDHAm L. REV. 3, 13 (2015)
("Many commentators have criticized the Obergefell Court for failing to address directly the
claimants' equal protection arguments, with much of this criticism focusing on the Court's
sidestepping the question of whether gay men and lesbians should be treated as a protected
class."); Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage,
6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 107, 113 (2015) (noting that Obergefell lacks "any discussion of the tiers
of review that have traditionally been necessary to an analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause").
85. See, e.g., Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell
Decision: Equal Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 11 (2016) ("The
Obergefell opinion did not use the magic words of 'heightened scrutiny,' but it is clear from the
language and disposition of the case that the Supreme Court gave same-sex couples exactly the
ruling and the underlying reasoning they asked for in their briefs."); Lauren Sudeall Lucas,
Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1613 n.23 (2015) ("[In Obergefell,] the Court
provided additional protection to sexual-orientation minorities without explicitly applying a
higher level of scrutiny."); James M. Oleske, Jr., "State Inaction, " Equal Protection, and
Religious Resistance to LGBTRights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2016) ("Although the Court
did not formally declare that sexual-orientation discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, its findings make that conclusion virtually inescapable under
the traditional criteria for such scrutiny."). But see Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the
Historical Legacies ofFeminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 131 (2015) ("[W]ithout a declaration
that heightened scrutiny should apply to all sexual orientation-based classifications, it seemed
possible to confine Obergefell's analysis to marriage and leave other injustices untouched.").
86. Similarly, in Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017), the Supreme Court
rejected rather than accepted Missouri's proffered biology-based reason for excluding same-sex
spouses on birth certificates.
87. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that Windsor "requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims
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whether it be race, sex, or sexual orientation discrimination, raises serious
equal protection issues.
As for the pro-life police officer, their refusal does not trigger any heighted
scrutiny under equal protection. Despite the fact that only women become
pregnant and have abortions, the government's refusal to protect an abortion
clinic would not amount to discrimination on the basis of sex for equal
protection purposes. According to a much-maligned decision made before
there were any women sitting on the Supreme Court, discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex under the Equal
Protection Clause."
On the other hand, the government's failure to issue marriage licenses to
LGBT couples on an equal basis probably amounts to unconstitutional sexual
orientation discrimination. Allowing county clerks to opt out of providing
licenses to same-sex couples will creates tangible obstacles-such as waiting
until a willing clerk comes on duty, or driving to another county's office if
there are none-only LGBT couples have to face.89 Unanswered legal
questions, such as the level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation
discrimination claims,90 in addition to specific factual issues, such as whether
involving sexual orientation"); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Miss. Dep't of Human Servs.,
175 F. Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (striking down same-sex adoption ban for violating
equal protection after finding that "it seems clear the [Obergefell] Court applied something greater
than rational-basis review"); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 426 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(applying intermediate scrutiny and noting that "[a]lthough Windsor did not identify the
appropriate level of scrutiny, its discussion is manifestly not representative of deferential
review"). Some cases follow in Obergefell's footsteps by applying heightened scrutiny without
admitting it. See, e.g., Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-CV-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *3 (D. Utah
July 22, 2015) ("Because Defendants were unable to provide a rational basis for treating male
spouse of women who give birth through assisted reproduction involving the use of donor sperm
differently than identically situated female spouse, the court need not reach the question of which
level of scrutiny applies, and the court concludes the statute violates Plaintiffs' rights to Equal
Protection."). But see Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2015) ("We have
always applied rational-basis review to state actions involving sexual orientation. . . . Obergefell
did not abrogate those prior cases.").
88. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) ("While it is true that only women
can become pregnant[,] it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . . The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female,
the second includes members of both sexes.").
89. But see Slater v. Douglas County, 743 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1195 (D. Or. 2010) ("So long
as the [same-sex] registration is processed in a timely fashion, the registrants have suffered no
injury.").
90. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Because both Windsor and Obergefell
struck down laws as failing even rational basis scrutiny, the level of scrutiny triggered by sexual
orientation is not dispositive.
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public employees may also refuse to serve other groups,91 make the outcome
uncertain, but this differential treatment may well violate the Equal
Protection Clause.92 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit ruled against Kim Davis in part
because "it cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County
Clerk's office, apart from who personally occupies that office, may decline
to act in conformity with the United States Constitution as interpreted by a
dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court."9 3
In fact, the Equal Protection Clause may be violated even without any
material harm. This argument depends on an expressivist view of equal
protection, where the harm to equality is caused by the expressive content of
the challenged government action. 94 The focus is on the message conveyed
by the state's conduct rather than its intent or its practical effect. 95 State
conduct-such as providing unequal service to protected class members-
violates the Constitution's guarantee of equality by failing to treat each
person with equal dignity.96 That is, "the government may not express, in
words or deeds, that it values some of us more than others." 97 For example,
offering civil unions instead of marriages to mixed-race or same-sex couples,
even if the unions came with exactly the same tangible benefits, would violate
91. The Equal Protection claim is even stronger if exemptions are granted only for licenses
to LBGT couples and not previously divorced or mixed race or mixed faith or other couples that
trigger religious objections. See Oleske, supra note 85, at 37-38.
92. See In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728, 744 (Wyo. 2017) ("If we held that freedom of religious
opinion meant no state official in Wyoming had to marry a same-sex couple if it offended his or
her religious belief, the right of same-sex couples to marry under the United States Constitution
would be obviated."); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious
Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 274, 294 (2010) ("[U]nder both the equal protection clause of
the 14th Amendment, and related equality provisions of state constitutions . . . state officers have
duties of equal respect to all persons within the state. It is very difficult to see how one can square
such a duty with a right, religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a
particular class of individuals.").
93. Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880, 2015 WL 10692640, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015); see
also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 92, at 294 ("[S]tate officers have duties of equal respect to all
persons within the state. It is very difficult to see how one can square such a duty with a right,
religion-based or otherwise, to refuse to provide public services to a particular class of
individuals.").
94. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533-45 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension ofEqual Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
95. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 94, at 1533-45.
96. Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347,
380-81 (2012).
97. Hellman, supra note 94, at 13.
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the Equal Protection Clause because it treats those couples as second-class
citizens.98
The government arguably conveys this message of second-class
citizenship9 9 when it allows public employees to refuse to serve same-sex
couples because they condemn the union, even when others step in.' When
striking down on equal protection grounds a Mississippi law allowing county
clerks to recuse themselves so long as the recusal did not cause any delay, a
federal district court held that "the recusal provision itself deprives LGBT
citizens of governmental protection from separate treatment. . . . Such
treatment viscerally confronts same-sex couples with the same message of
inferiority and second-class citizenship that was rejected in [Windsor and
Obergefell]."101
Some might respond that the true message is accommodating religious
exercise, and therefore the refusals communicate a commitment to religious
liberty, not a disregard for LGBT equality.1 0 2 Others might rebut that
98. Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2011) ("[T]his Article ultimately concludes that laws
withholding the term marriage from same-sex couples unconstitutionally convey the message of
second-class citizenship . . . .").
99. See Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal
Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L.
& Soc. POL'Y 236, 241 (2010) ("To be candid, I find myself unnerved by proponents' failure to
recognize the dignitary harm at the heart of public refusals to serve historically marginalized
groups."); Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2586 (2015) ("Even if the government can
provide for affected third parties in alternative ways, these alternatives may not shield third parties
from dignitary harms.").
100. This also assumes that the employee's refusal is not equated to the government's refusal,
which may be a wrong assumption to make. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text
(discussing, in the Establishment Clause context, the possibility that a public employee's refusal
to perform job duties would not be equated to government action).
101. Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417-CWR-LRA, 2016 WL 3562647, at *23 (S.D. Miss.
June 30, 2016). Both Windsor and Obergefell seem to endorse an expressivist approach. More
than once they emphasize the message that differential treatment conveys: "[I]t tells those
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy ... [,] a second-tier
marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple .... " United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2694 (2013); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) ("[It] impose[s] stigma
and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.").
102. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 74, at 322-23 n.16 ("[T]he possibility of dignitary harm
will not take policymakers very far because there are two dignitary harms here the harm to
lesbian and gay couples who are turned aside, and the harm to religious believers who are told
that their beliefs are not to be tolerated."). Alternately, if the accommodation is done without
public knowledge, then perhaps no message is conveyed at all.
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discriminating in the name of religion is still discriminating,'0 3 and therefore
under an expressivist theory, barred by the Equal Protection Clause.1 0 4
In sum, there is a real constitutional risk in excusing religious government
employees from their official duties if that religious exemption results in
favoring one religious viewpoint in violation of the Establishment Clause or
in unequal treatment of a group covered by the Equal Protection Clause.
Although there are a range of government employee religion claims, those
involving government employees refusing to do their job are easily resolved
under a government employee religion doctrine that mirrors the government
employee speech doctrine. This conduct, which is not just pursuant to official
duties but consists of official duties, is government conduct. As such, the
Constitution does not protect the refusal. Quite the opposite: The Constitution
may affirmatively bar it. In contrast, requests for dress accommodations,
which are probably not pursuant to official duties, would not be screened out
and would proceed to the next threshold inquiry.
2. Matter of Public Concern Threshold
Under the government employee speech doctrine, the next threshold
inquiry is whether the speech is on a matter of public interest. If not, then the
government's interests prevail over the free speech ones without further
analysis. Thus, of the three classic justifications for protecting speech, one-
promoting self-expression and personal autonomy-seems to hold no sway
when it comes to government employees. As it turns out, this devalued free
103. See Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemptions
to Public Accommodations Laws, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 705, 724 (2014) ("[W]hile the right to religious
freedom is fundamental, religion cannot be used to discriminate, and thus to harm the dignity of
people who deserve basic respect and recognition in our society."); Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious
Discrimination and the Religious Exemption Question, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2069, 2090 (2011)
("Just as a claimed religious belief does not justify murder, theft, or tortious conduct, so it does
not justify odious discrimination against individuals because of their identity or other immutable
characteristics, when prohibited by law.").
104. Moreover, just as Herbert Wechsler's claim in Toward Neutral Principles in
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1959), that segregation involved a clash between
equal competing rights overlooked that one group was powerful and one subordinated, so too with
objecting Christians and the LGBT community. See Flynn, supra note 99, at 257-59; see also id.
at 258 ("Importantly, however, this assumption ignores the subordination inherent in state-
sponsored permission to discriminate against an unpopular minority.").
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speech justification is the one that comes closest to the reason we protect free
exercise of religion.
The three classic justifications for protecting free speech are: (1) to
encourage a diverse marketplace of ideas to aid our search for knowledge;
(2) to facilitate democratic self-rule; and (3) to promote autonomy, self-
expression, and self-realization.o' The "public concern" requirement is
linked to the first two free speech justifications, especially the second one
centered on participatory democracy.
In common with the first two free speech justifications, the "public
concern" requirement focuses on the value of speech to audiences. The first
justification, encouraging a marketplace of ideas, is all about ensuring a free
flow of information to help recipients with the search for knowledge and
truth. The second justification, facilitating democratic self-governance,
likewise focuses on the need for a free flow of information, this time to ensure
that the electorate has all the information necessary to vote wisely. 0 6 A free
flow of information anchors both justifications, and the matter of public
concern test basically specifies what kind of information needs to flow freely.
The public concern test seems particularly tailored to the democratic self-
rule justification. The Pickering Court describes "[t]he public interest in
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance" as "the
core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment."o' In Connick,
the Supreme Court states, "The First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.' '[S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government,""o adding that
"[a]ccordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public
issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,' and is entitled to special protection."1 09
105. Distrust of government, while not technically a value or goal, is also a consistent theme
running through free speech jurisprudence. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 85-86 (1982).
106. In order for our democracy "of the people, by the people, for the people" to work, the
people need the ability to make informed political decisions. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1965). Alexander
Meiklejohn would actually privilege the right to receive information over the right to speak:
"What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (2004).
107. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
108. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
109. Id. (citation omitted); see also id. (noting that in Pickering, the "subject was 'a matter
of legitimate public concern' upon which 'free and open debate is vital to informed decision-
making by the electorate"' (citation omitted)).
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The Supreme Court has stressed that government employee speech
warrants protection because government employees often have special
insight on political issues"o: "[S]peech by public employees on subject matter
related to their employment holds special value precisely because those
employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their
employment.""' After all, "[g]overnment employees are often in the best
position to know what ails the agencies for which they work.""1 2 In short, in
explaining why the Free Speech Clause protects government employee
speech-if it's speech on matters of public concern-the Supreme Court has
emphasized its importance to democratic self-governance.
Missing from the Court's discussions, which focus on providing
information useful to public debate, is recognition that free speech furthers
the autonomy of the speaker. To make the constitutional cut, public employee
speech has to be valuable to its audience. The Court occasionally
acknowledges the autonomy justification,1 3 but it is not offered as a reason
to protect government employee speech and is not incorporated into the
government employee speech doctrine." 4 On the contrary, the Supreme Court
observed in Garcetti that "the First Amendment interests at stake extend
beyond the individual speaker.""' This is not to say that government
employees derive no autonomy benefit: Protecting their utterances on matters
of public concern allows them to express themselves and to contribute to
political discourse. It is rather to say that the autonomy considerations do not
enter the government employee speech calculus. For example, it is irrelevant
whether government employees derive more autonomy-related benefits from
speaking on private matters compared to public matters. The value to the
speaker's autonomy is not measured, only the value to the public is.
110. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) ("[P]ublic employees 'are uniquely
qualified to comment' on 'matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public
at large."' (citation omitted)).
111. Id. at 2379.
112. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion).
113. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (per curiam) ("The interest at stake is as much
the public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate
it.").
114. Strictly speaking, the Pickering balancing test is phrased in terms of the speaker's free
speech interests. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."). The doctrine, however, only protects the free flow of
information deemed useful to an audience.
115. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
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The implications of the "public concern" test for government employee
religion may be limited. Like one's viewpoint on politics and politicians,"16
one's viewpoint on religion is arguably always a matter of public concern,
and therefore the public concern requirement may not be difficult to meet in
a government employee religion claim. More than one court has taken this
position. For example, in evaluating a public school teacher's challenge to a
law that barred her religious jewelry, the district court wrote that "[p]laintiff s
symbolic non-verbal speech is an expression of her personal religious
convictions and viewpoint, which is a matter of social and community
concern entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment."'"7
However, this position has not been uniformly adopted. Other courts have
found that individual religious belief, especially when it takes the form of a
personal grievance regarding assigned duties, is not necessarily a matter of
public concern."' For example, in a case where an assistant district attorney
was reluctant to charge protestors with trespassing on a United States Navy
base in Puerto Rico, the district court held that there was no expression on a
matter of public concern: "In the present case, Plaintiff claims that she told
her supervisors that she had a moral conflict with prosecuting Vieques cases.
Her expression that her personal beliefs prevent her from working on Vieques
cases is not a matter of public concern.""1 9 Granted her moral beliefs were not
expressly religious, but there is no reason to think the analysis would be
different if they were.1 20 Religious or not, "[h]er statements or personal
116. In Rankin v. McPherson, the Supreme Court interpreted "[i]f they go for him again, I
hope they get him" as a criticism of the current President because "[t]he statement was made in
the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration." Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380, 386 (1987).
117. Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 559 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
118. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Although personal
religious conviction-even the honestly held belief that one must announce such conviction to
others-obviously is a matter of great concern to many members of the public, in this case it
simply is not a matter of 'public concern' as that term of art has been used in the constitutional
sense."); see Draper v. Logan Cty. Pub. Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 614 (W.D. Ky. 2005)
("[T]he public concern inquiry is an individualized one, and the mere fact that an employee's
speech involves a topic traditionally considered of public import does not necessarily mean that
the speech is on a matter of public concern . . . .' [I]f the speech concerns a matter of public interest
but the expression addresses only the personal effect upon the employee, then as a matter of law
the speech is not of public concern."' (citation omitted)).
119. Mendoza Toro v. Gil, 110 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.P.R. 2000).
120. In fact, there might be an Establishment Clause issue if deeply held religious beliefs
were accommodated but deeply held secular beliefs were not. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that it would violate the Establishment
Clause to "draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and
secular beliefs on the other" when granting conscientious objector to the draft status).
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feelings vis-A-vis her work assignment are not an issue of public concern.
Rather, they are complaints about her work duties."121
A separate question is whether the public concern inquiry as a whole
translates from government employee speech to government employee
religion. Speech is expressive, and therefore is capable of conveying a
message on a matter of public interest. Conduct is not always expressive.
Indeed, more than one court has rejected as expressive conduct a refusal to
fulfill a job responsibility.1 2 2 Consequently, it may not make sense to ask
whether a particular act enables the free flow of information on a matter of
public interest. This criticism seems entirely fair.1 23 The public employee
speech test was, after all, designed to evaluate speech, not conduct. And while
some religion claims involve expression, not all do. In fact, the lower court
split on matter of public interest in religious conduct cases could be explained
as a division between those cases that involve expressive conduct 2 4 and those
cases that do not.1 25
At the same time, the matter of public concern inquiry may not be
completely irrelevant for government employee religion, if only because it
highlights what First Amendment commitments are deemed important
enough in the government employee context. Or more accurately, the public
concern requirement suggests a First Amendment interest that is not
sufficiently important-namely the goal of furthering individual
autonomy.1 2 6
Yet promoting autonomy is a major, if not the major, reason for protecting
individual religious liberty.1 27 Nadia Sawicki, for example, describes three
121. Mendoza Toro, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
122. Id. (holding that work responsibilities are not expressive conduct); Fabrizio v. City of
Providence, 104 A.3d 1289, 1293 (R.I. 2014) (finding that firefighters appearing in LGBT parade
as part of work responsibilities and "solely as members of the Providence Fire Department, did
not constitute a form of expression on their part").
123. The criticism would be inapposite only if every religious act amounts to symbolic
conduct for free speech purposes. However, such an approach to religious conduct would
essentially eliminate the distinction between speech and conduct and lead to free speech
protection for every religiously motivated act. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or
Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMoRY L.J. 241 (2015).
124. For example, Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552 (W.D. Pa.
2003), involved wearing a cross, which the court found to be expressive conduct.
125. For example, Mendoza Toro, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 35, involved refusing to do one's job,
which the court held was not expressive.
126. I use the word autonomy to cover a constellation of overlapping interests, including but
not limited to self-realization, self-expression, self-integrity and self-determination.
127. Note that it is individual religious liberty and not institutional religious liberty that is at
issue here. The Supreme Court does not always treat them the same. Compare Emp't Div. v.
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possible justifications for religious exemptions.128 One of them is the
pragmatic view that "a civil society is unlikely to function effectively if it
chooses to punish conscientious objectors." 29 While it may be true of civil
society, it is not true for civil service.' 30 Another justification is overtly
moral/religious, and "considers acts grounded in conscience worthy of
respect because such acts are more likely to reflect objective moral truths." 3 '
In other words, religious exemptions should be granted because, objectively
speaking, they reflect what God or religious morality commands. 3 2 This
assumes something impossible-that there is an objective religious truth that
the government can discern.133 Moreover, such an assumption clashes with
the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from endorsing
one version of religious truth over another.13 4
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (religious claim of individual), with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 176-77 (2012) (religious claim of church).
128. I do not address a textual argument for religious exemptions because the text is opaque.
An originalist argument for religious exemptions is also excluded because not only do I reject
originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation, but also scholars do not agree on what the
original view was. Compare generally Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right ofReligious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992), with Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofFree Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1409 (1990).
129. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Hollow Promise ofFreedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
1389, 1405 (2012); see also id. ("[A]lthough granting conscience-based exemptions from legal
obligations as a matter of course may wreak havoc on the state's ability to maintain order, the
same can be said of a state that rejects claims of conscience altogether."); Steven H. Shiffrin, The
Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 27 (2004) ("Attempted
enforcement of laws against religious claimants might not even succeed in controlling external
conduct. In fact, it can frequently promote disrespect for law." (footnote omitted)).
130. On the contrary, granting religious accommodations to public employees might
undermine civil service's ability to function effectively. See discussion supra Part I.C.
131. Sawicki, supra note 129, at 1408.
132. The Supreme Court has written, "The [Free Exercise] Clause was originally understood
to preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's God." Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 576 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)
(adding the caveat, "unless those activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs of
the State"). There are two ways to understand the claim that religious liberty is protected so that
people can fulfill their spiritual obligations. One is that God's commandments must be obeyed,
which falls into this second category. Another is that people must be allowed to obey what they
believe to be God's commands, which falls into the autonomy category.
133. "For example, one person's conscience might direct her to disconnect a dying loved
one's ventilator to relieve him from suffering and allow him to die; another person's conscience
might demand that she request aggressive treatment to preserve her loved one's life at all costs."
Sawicki, supra note 129, at 1409. They cannot both reflect a greater moral truth. Id. How would
the government even decide?
134. See, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 108 (2002) ("The
Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.").
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Consequently, it is Sawicki's third justification that must carry the day,
which is that religious exemptions further individual autonomy. "There is
intrinsic moral value in autonomy and self-determination, proponents argue,
and the best way for the state to promote this value is to accommodate those
with sincere conscientious beliefs."'35 Many scholars agree.' 36 "Certain
'zones of conscience' are entitled to legal protection ... [to] protect the right
of individuals to define and govern their own existence."'3 7 In particular,
religious conscience is protected in order to safeguard "the right of an
individual to make choices about his or her spiritual life."'38 In short, "the free
exercise clause should primarily be understood to be an autonomy
right . . ..
However, government employee speech is not protected for the
employee's sake, but for the sake of the broader public who benefit from their
(often uniquely informed) viewpoint. Even if a government employee's
workplace speech greatly advances their personal autonomy, the First
Amendment does not reach it unless it is on a matter of public concern. Under
a parallel jurisprudence, the same would be true for government employee
religion. Religious conduct,1 40 no matter how much it furthered the
employee's autonomy, would not be protected by the First Amendment
unless it was expressive and expressed something on a matter of public
interest.
Applying a parallel jurisprudence, the consequences for the opening
hypotheticals depend on whether the religious claim involves expression, or
135. Sawicki, supra note 129, at 1406; see also id at 1406-07 ("Whether arising from a
Kantian view of the unconditional worth of all persons and the resulting respect for their own
moral destiny, or from John Stuart Mill's perspective that 'society should permit individuals to
develop according to their convictions,' courts and commentators take it as a given that
autonomous choice is valuable and should be promoted." (citation omitted)).
136. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REv. 1501, 1529
(2012) ("As a number of scholars have argued, an individual's moral integrity offers the most
compelling moral basis for respecting her conscience.").
137. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path ofAmerican Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology
to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2000).
138. Benjamin L. Berger, Law's Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277,
309 (2007); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 256 (1st ed. 1998) (noting that
"religion is considered a core example of the kind of personal autonomy which the liberal state is
pledged to protect").
139. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis ofReligion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 89, 94 (1990); see also id. at 95 ("[The free exercise of religion] is part of that basic autonomy
of identity and self-creation which we preserve from state manipulation, not because of its utility
to social organization, but because of its importance to the human condition.").
140. Religious speech is already subject to the existing free speech doctrine.
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at least expressive conduct. If it does, as courts have held with regard to
religious garb, then the public concern test applies to religious expression as
it applies to nonreligious expression. If it does not, and the refusal to perform
job responsibilities falls into this category, then there is no protection.
Alternatively, perhaps the public concern test should simply be deemed inapt.
At the same time, given the low priority assigned to personal autonomy as a
reason to protect government employee speech, perhaps the same should also
apply to government employee religion.
3. Undue Disruption
If the public employee speech passes both thresholds (or if one of the
thresholds is discarded),' 4 ' then the Free Speech Clause protects the speech
unless it unduly disrupts the government workplace. The Supreme Court has
described this as "balanc[ing] between the interests of the [government
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."1 4 2
Accommodating a government employee's religion is not necessarily
disruptive. Allowing a county clerk to wear a hijab or allowing a police
officer to grow a beard should not upset working relationships, or interfere
with their job duties, or bring disrepute onto their department. The effect on
the efficient provision of services to the public seems minimal.1 43
141. Part III discusses critiques of the existing doctrine and its applicability to government
employee religion in more detail. Even though government employee refusals would probably be
unprotected for failing the pursuant to official duties threshold and for failing the "matter of public
interest" threshold, I nevertheless subject them to Pickering balancing for two reasons: first, to
underscore other reasons why refusals ought to be unprotected; second, to demonstrate the
outcome to those who would eliminate both thresholds and favor a pure balancing.
142. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
143. And indeed, several courts have essentially so held, albeit in the context of a Title VII
suit rather than a free exercise one. See, e.g., Lewis v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418,
445-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting a Transit Authority's claim that allowing a headcovering for
Muslim bus drivers "undercut[s] the [Transit Authority's] right as an employer to present its
chosen image to the public through a uniformly applied appearance standard" especially since "it
permitted other bus drivers to deviate from its headgear policy without compromising its public
image" (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
More often than not, religious government employees bring Title VII cases. (Actually, Title
VII is the exclusive remedy for religious discrimination in federal employment claims. Brown v.
Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976)). In Title VII, the question is not whether the
accommodation would be unduly disruptive, but whether the accommodation would impose an
"undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (providing a defense if an "employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious
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On the other hand, an employee refusing to do their job seems to be the
epitome of workplace disruption. In finding that Pickering's letter to the
editor was protected free speech, the Court emphasized that it had not "in any
way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in
the classroom or . .. interfered with the regular operation of the schools
generally."'4 4 In contrast, refusing to do one's job by definition interferes with
the "proper performance of daily duties."
Moreover, allowing public employees to opt out of assignments could
create a logistical nightmare. As one court put it:
If all officers were permitted ... to abstain from enforcing laws
which they believed were inappropriate, it would be impossible for
the [police department] to organize its forces and to guarantee that
there would be a sufficient number of officers at any given moment
to enforce any given law." In short, the court held, "The
dependability of the police force would be destroyed.'45
These sentiments have been echoed by other courts. Judge Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit observed that many police officers "have religious
scruples about particular activities: to give just a few examples, Baptists
oppose liquor as well as gambling, Roman Catholics oppose abortion, Jews
and Muslims oppose the consumption of pork, and a few faiths . . . include
hallucinogenic drugs in their worship and thus oppose legal prohibitions of
those drugs."146 He then concludes, "Juggling assignments to make each
compatible with the varying religious beliefs of a heterogeneous police force
would be daunting to managers and difficult for other officers who would be
called on to fill in for the objectors."1 4 7
This analysis, however, may turn on whether a court considers the
disruption caused by one employee or the disruption caused by all employees
with religious scruples. The courts discussing the logistical problems above
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business"). As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, anything other than a minimal disruption amounts to an undue
hardship. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) ("To require [defendant]
to bear more than a de minimis cost . .. is an undue hardship.").
144. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
145. Parrott v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 91-0049, 1991 WL 126020, at *3 (D.D.C.
June 25, 1991).
146. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003).
147. Id.; see also Mark Strasser, On Same-Sex Marriage and Matters of Conscience, 17 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 35 (2010) ("Commentators suggest that legislatures should afford an
exemption to those who for religious reasons do not wish to serve members of the LGBT
community .... [S]uch an exemption, once offered, might be difficult to cabin both with respect
to the kinds of services subject to the exemption and to the groups of 'objectionable' people who
need not be served.").
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were not picturing a single objector, but every potential objector. Of course,
even a single employee refusing to perform their duties can upset the
workplace. A high school biology teacher who refuses to teach evolution
cannot so easily be replaced for just a week or two.1 48 Similarly, a staff nurse
in the Labor & Delivery section of a hospital who refuses to help with an
emergency abortion, and whose refusal delays life-saving surgery for a half
an hour while a replacement is found, clearly causes a serious disruption to
the state hospital's ability to deliver health services.1 49
However, perhaps some individual refusals may be accommodated
without completely disrupting an office. For example, an IRS tax specialist
refused to process tax exempt status applications from organizations his
religion condemned, such as those that promoted LGBT and abortion
rights.' The IRS argued that his failure to fulfill his job responsibilities
"create[d] problems with the efficient and expeditious operations of the
office.""' The IRS also worried about opening the floodgates to similar
requests, leading to the mayhem described by other courts. 5 2 The district
court was unpersuaded. First, it held that at most two percent of the tax
specialist's workload presented any religious conflict, and that other tax
specialists could easily absorb this work.1' Second, the floodgates scenario
was unlikely, 14 and moreover, the question the court should address was just
148. See LeVake v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 656, 625 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(tenth grade biology teacher who refused to teach evolution for religious reasons was reassigned
to teach ninth grade natural science); see also Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1272 (7th
Cir. 1979) (probationary Kindergarten teacher, a Jehovah's Witness, who refused for religious
reasons to sing patriotic songs, to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance, and to celebrate certain
national holidays, was discharged).
149. See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) ("In
November 1995, Shelton refused to treat another emergency patient. This patient who was
'standing in a pool of blood' was diagnosed with placenta previa. The attending Labor and
Delivery section physician determined the situation was life-threatening . . . . Because the
procedure would terminate the pregnancy, Shelton refused to assist or participate. Eventually,
another nurse took her place. The Hospital claims Shelton's refusal to assist delayed the
emergency procedure for thirty minutes.").
150. Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1174, 1180 (D.D.C. 1979). This case predated
Smith.
151. Id. at 1180.
152. Id. at 1181 ("[O]thers will be encouraged to do likewise, and a point will soon be reached
where the agency will be faced with very real and substantial practical problems.").
153. Id. at 1180; see also McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 526 (N.D. Cal.
1980) (holding that the government should have reasonably accommodated window clerk whose
religion prevented her from processing draft registrations).
154. Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1182 ("Unlike prohibitions on laboring during certain days of
the week, the refusal to make decisions with respect to specific issues does not appear to be a
widespread and deeply ingrained religious tenet.").
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this accommodation, not potential future accommodations.' The district
court acknowledged uncertainty in the law regarding this question, 5 6 but
reasoned that if the court had to consider every potential exemption, then all
requests would be disruptive: "Were the law otherwise, any accommodation,
however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship because, if
sufficiently magnified through predictions of the future behavior of the
employee's co-workers, even the most minute accommodation could be
calculated to reach that level." 7 On the other hand, to completely disregard
possible future requests risks underestimating the disruption that would
follow. One resolution might be to consider the likely, as opposed to
hypothetical, repercussions, though that standard could be challenging to
apply. The Supreme Court has issued no definitive rule on this question,
although it has noted that the disruption need not be "manifest" before the
employer may take action"' and that "substantial weight [is given] to
government employers' reasonable predictions of disruption."1 5 9
155. Id. (holding that 'undue hardship' must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished
from anticipated or multiplied hardship").
156. Id. (noting "the absence of authoritative guidance" on this question). Granted, the court
was addressing the "undue hardship" test of Title VII, but similar uncertainty plagues "undue
disruption" in government employee cases.
157. Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1182.
158. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) ("Furthermore, we do not see the necessity
for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the
destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action."). The Court has also held
that the more valuable the speech, the stronger the showing of disruption: "We caution that a
stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters
of public concern." Id
159. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion).
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In any event, religious refusals create more than scheduling problems.
Such refusals may threaten the authority of a supervisorl60 or endanger close
working relationships.161 In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
insubordination of refusing to do one's job is sufficient grounds for
termination:
Perhaps the simplest example of a statement by a public employee
that would not be protected by the First Amendment would be
answering "No" to a request that the employee perform a lawful
task within the scope of his duties. Although such a refusal is
"speech," which implicates First Amendment interests, it is also
insubordination, and as such it may serve as the basis for a lawful
dismissal. 162
This statement seems fairly conclusive vis-a-vis government employees who
simply refuse to perform a job duty. Then again, because unpopular rather
than popular speech will alienate colleagues,1 63 giving too much weight to the
disruption of workplace relationships risks "constitutionalizing a heckler's
veto." 64
However, there is also the reputation and obligations of the government
office. According to the Supreme Court, bringing a government agency into
disrepute may be reason enough for the Pickering balance to tip in favor of
the government. There are many ways to harm the reputation of a government
agency. A police officer selling a sex tape of himself in police uniform is
one.1 65 Racist, sexist, or homophobic remarks by a public employee,
160. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (noting that employer need not "tolerate action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working
relationships" (emphasis added)).
161. Refusals may endanger close working relationships, although co-workers might not
mind swapping duties, or even covering a colleague's duties.
162. Connick, 461 U.S. at 163 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Domiano v. Village of
River Grove, 904 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670,
675-76 (11th Cir. 1984) (same, adding "[e]ven the dissenters, who would have precluded the
questionnaire-distributor from being fired because her speech, in their view, was protected, drew
a line beyond which in-office speech would not be protected").
163. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv.
1007, 1019 (2005) ("Speech that sparks too much opposition will be vulnerable to public
employer restriction and retaliation, whereas speech that is sufficiently in line with mainstream
beliefs to be unobjectionable will be protected.").
164. See id.; see also Kim, supra note 17, at 619 ("[B]y suggesting that the maintenance of
'discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers' is a relevant factor in the
balancing analysis, Pickering appears to 'constitutionaliz[e] . . . a heckler's veto' in the
employment setting." (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
165. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78, 84 (2004) (per curiam) ("The speech in
question was detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.").
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especially a high ranking one or one who has contact with the public, might
be another.1 6 6 A teacher who publicly demeans her own students is yet
another.1 6 7
Several lower courts have framed the issue as losing the public's trust
rather than losing the public's good opinion. The two are intertwined, since
the public is less likely to trust an agency it holds in low regard. These cases
argue that government entities ranging from the police to public schools
cannot properly function without the public trust. For example, if you do not
trust the police, you will not assist them with their inquiries or call them if
you need help.1 68
In particular, these courts emphasize that the public trusts that the
government will be neutral in its provision of services. "It would seem
unremarkable that public protectors such as police and firefighters must be
neutral in providing their services. "169 The same holds true for public health
care providers,1 70  public school teachers, and public defenders and
prosecutors, to name just a few. A refusal to provide services to certain
groups-whether it be members of a racial minority or members of a
166. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding termination of
police officers and fire fighters who had put on black face and paraded on a racist float); Pappas
v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding termination of police officer who
disseminated racist and anti-Semitic materials); McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 936-37, 940
(11th Cir. 1985) (upholding termination of police officer who revealed during TV interview that
he recruited for the KKK); Shirvell v. Dep't of Attorney Gen., 866 N.W.2d 478, 484, 506
(Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding termination of assistant district attorney whose harassing blog
undermined anti-cyberharassing initiative and created the appearance that the Department could
not fairly represent the interests of gays or victims of harassment or stalking).
167. See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 476-77, 480 (3d Cir. 2015).
168. Pappas, 290 F.3d at 146-47 ("If the police department treats a segment of the population
of any race, religion, gender, national origin, or sexual preference, etc., with contempt, so that the
particular minority comes to regard the police as oppressor rather than protector, respect for law
enforcement is eroded and the ability of the police to do its work in that community is impaired.
Members of the minority will be less likely to report crimes, to offer testimony as witnesses, and
to rely on the police for their protection. When the police make arrests in that community, its
members are likely to assume that the arrests are a product of bias, rather than well-founded,
protective law enforcement. And the department's ability to recruit and train personnel from that
community will be damaged."); see also McMullen, 754 F.2d at 939 ("[T]he Government's
responsibilities to the public are manifest. The Sheriff s office is charged with securing the safety
of persons and property, and enforcing the law. Under our system of Government, that duty can
be performed effectively only with the consent of the vast majority of those citizens policed by
the Sheriff's office. Efficient law enforcement requires mutual respect, trust, and support.").
Some courts have argued that the same holds true for public education: "The position of public
school teacher requires a degree of public trust not found in many other positions of public
employment." Munroe, 805 F.3d at 475 (citation omitted).
169. Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2000).
170. Id. ("We would include public health care providers among such public protectors.").
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sexuality minority-would bring that expected neutrality into question.
Hence Judge Posner's insistence that a refusal's harm to the public trust is
more serious than its frustration of workplace logistics:
The objection to recusal in all of these cases is not the
inconvenience to the police department . .. though that might be
considerable in some instances. The objection is to the loss of public
confidence in governmental protective services if the public knows
that its protectors are at liberty to pick and choose whom to
protect.' 7 '
This concern is not present in every situation where an employee has a
religious objection to part of their job responsibilities. For example, a public
school cafeteria worker who refuses to touch that day's pork chops does not
raise it. On the other hand, refusing to serve a member of the public,
especially because of their race, sex, sexual orientation, or other protected
characteristic, undoubtedly compromises the public trust in their
government's neutral provision of services.
The question becomes how disruptive that loss of trust is. It is obviously
a problem when the government agency depends on the public's cooperation,
as the police and schools do. Thus, the police officer who refused to protect
an abortion clinic should lose on this particular disruption factor. Even if his
refusal was not based on a protected characteristic, public confidence, and
consequently police efficacy, would be undermined were the police able to
pick and choose who they protected. But what if the agency does not depend
on the public's cooperation-is the loss of public trust on its own sufficient
reason for the Pickering balance to favor the government?1 7 2 In other words,
how disruptive is the loss of public trust that follows a county's clerk's refusal
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples?1 73 It seems a stretch to argue
171. Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., concurring).
In fact, Judge Posner thought this issue was so important that he would have imposed a per se
rule against exemptions, at least for those government employees charged with protecting the
public: "The importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a
police department or fire department or equivalent public-safety agency that decides not to allow
recusal by its employees should be able to plead 'undue hardship' and thus escape any duty of
accommodation." Id.
172. This is, of course, assuming the inquiry even gets this far. The government may well
have prevailed earlier.
173. Whether the refusal violates the Equal Protection Clause is a separate question, see
supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text, unless the constitutional implications increase the
loss of trust and disruptiveness. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Where
a Government employee's job quintessentially involves public contact, the Government may take
into account the public's perception of that employee's expressive acts in determining whether
those acts are disruptive to the Government's operations.").
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that no government office can function effectively if the public loses
confidence in it.1 74 Of course, given the two threshold requirements, plus the
other types of disruption, it is unlikely a court will ever need to answer this
particular question.
All in all, a public employee who wishes to wear particular religious garb
might well prevail were government employee religion law modeled on the
existing government employee speech law. '7 First, what one wears, whether
a cross, a hijab, or a yarmulke, is not pursuant to official duties.1 76 Second,
because the Supreme Court recognizes that religion is a topic of public
concern, 77 to the extent that religious garb expresses a message about one's
faith, then it passes the second threshold.'7 The balancing test is the hardest
to generalize about, since the inquiry is so fact specific. While it is certainly
possible to come up with scenarios where religious garb might interfere with
job performance 79 or undermine public trust,'s I would suspect that more
often than not it would not be disruptive.
In contrast, it would seem that a public official who refuses to perform a
job duty on religious grounds would lose under any adaption of public
employee speech doctrine. First, their refusal would be refusal of official
174. Then again, the media firestorm and PR disaster might be sufficiently severe to disrupt
the smooth functioning of an office. However, that justification does raise some "heckler's veto"
issues.
175. This conclusion assumes that the government employee is not bringing a Free Exercise
Clause challenge to a law that is neutral and generally applicable. See supra notes 49-52 and
accompanying text.
176. Government sponsored private conduct may also violate the Establishment Clause, so
the conclusion that the religious exercise is not pursuant to official duties does not completely
eliminate Establishment Clause concerns. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
177. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2564 (2012) (listing topics of public concern
including "philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public
concern") (Alito, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d
954, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[S]peech concerning religion is unquestionably of inherent public
concern .... ).
178. This is not a guarantee, as courts do not always view dress as expressive. See Zalewska
v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting bus driver's claim thatwearing
skirt rather than pants to express her cultural values was expressive conduct).
179. For example, perhaps wearing certain religious items that were easy to grab might pose
a security risk for prison guards. E.g., Finnie v. Lee County, 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 781 (N.D. Miss.
2012) (holding that an exemption to a juvenile detention center's "no-skirts" policy for a juvenile
detention officer whose religion required long skirts would be an undue hardship).
180. For example, if one belonged to a racist religious group whose emblem was a well-
known symbol of racism.
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duties, which means they are complaining about government religion, not
private religion, and government religion is not protected at all. Indeed, the
doctrinal analysis could end there. Moreover, not only is government religion
not protected, but it is subject to both Establishment and Equal Protection
Clause limits. Even if their refusal were somehow not pursuant to official
duties, it would not necessarily be a matter of public concern, though this
factor may turn on whether the challenged conduct has an expressive
component. Finally, while the Pickering balance is highly fact-specific, there
is strong reason to conclude that the disruption caused by a government
official refusing to do their job, whether due to loss of smooth functioning of
the workplace or loss of public trust and confidence, outweighs the uncertain
First Amendment value. In short, if we were to apply the government
employee speech approach to government employee religion, the constitution
would not bar (and might even require) terminating a government employee
for a religious refusal.
B. Doctrinal Hesitations
As a practical matter, one might argue that this analysis is beside the point
for two reasons."' First, it is difficult to win a Free Exercise Clause
exemption under current doctrine, and government employee religion claims
are often dispatched without needing to take the government employee
context into account. Second, it is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), or its state counterparts, that drives most religious liberty litigation
right now, and the constitutional analysis does not speak to RFRA. These are
both relevant concerns, and I will address them in turn.
181. There is a third reason involving Title VII that is beyond the scope of this Article.
According to Supreme Court precedent, Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employees'
workplace religious discrimination claims. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835
(1976) ("[Title VII] provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal
employment."). Some courts have even held that Title VII preempts RFRA as well as the Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding
that Title VII preempts RFRA); Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2007).
However, Title VII does not preempt religious claims of state (vs. federal) employees and it does
not exempt religious claims that fall outside the "religious discrimination" rubric. See Otto v.
Heckler, 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), modified, 802 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986).
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELIGION
1. Free Exercise After Smith
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith 8 2 fundamentally changed Free Exercise Clause doctrine.'83 Before the
Supreme Court's 1990 Smith decision, religious objectors were entitled to
exemptions from any law that imposed a substantial burden on their free
exercise unless that law passed strict scrutiny. 8 4 After Smith, neutral laws of
general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, regardless of
the religious burdens they may impose.' A law is neutral as long as it does
not intentionally single out religion for disfavor,18 and it is generally
applicable if it applies across the board.8 7 Although most challenges are to
laws that are neutral and generally applicable, not all are. Those are the cases
that benefit from the government employee religion analysis.
The free exercise section is often the shortest part of a government
employee decision.' Because the majority of challenged regulations,
including those requiring a government employee to do their job, qualify as
neutral and generally applicable, free exercise challenges to them are
generally nonstarters. One Seventh Circuit analysis is basically three
sentences:
After Employment Division v. Smith, any argument that failure to
accommodate [Agent] Ryan's religiously motivated [refusal to
fulfill his job responsibilities] violates the free exercise clause of the
first amendment is untenable. Smith holds that rules neutral with
respect to religion satisfy that clause. The FBI did not hold Ryan's
182. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
183. 1 am speaking only of the official doctrine. Although the test for free exercise violations
underwent a major shift, the actual decisions at the Supreme Court did not, as it had rejected most
free exercise claims. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 743, 756 (1992) (describing the Court's pre-Smith free exercise standard of review as "strict
in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact").
184. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963). This test is often called the Sherbert v. Verner test.
185. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80. The Supreme Court has noted that "[n]eutrality and general
applicability are interrelated, and ... failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that
the other has not been satisfied." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
186. See, e.g., Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (finding ordinances were not neutral
because "suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the
ordinances").
187. See, e.g., id. at 543-45 (finding ordinances were not generally applicable since they
were grossly underinclusive).
188. To the extent the courts have engaged in more nuanced analysis, it has usually been
under Title VII, which requires employers, including government employers, to reasonably
accommodate the religious needs of their employees. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2 (2012).
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faith against him ... and treated him no more severely than it would
have treated an agent who refused a direct order for secular
reasons. 189
Other courts are similarly brief and to the point.1 90 However, there are
exceptions. For example, a state law that barred public school teachers from
wearing religious garb specifically targeted a religious practice, and therefore
did not amount to a neutral and generally applicable law.191 In addition, courts
have found that laws that provide a secular exemption but not a religious
exemption, such as a police department policy allowing beards for medical
but not religious reasons, are not "neutral and generally applicable."1 92
Therefore, a more extended free exercise analysis is not unheard of,
especially for religious claims other than religious refusals.
Doctrinally, laws that fail to qualify as neutral and generally applicable do
not automatically violate the Free Exercise Clause. Rather, they are
unconstitutional if they (a) impose a substantial religious burden and
(b) cannot pass strict scrutiny. 19' In other words, the Sherbert v. Verner test,
the reigning doctrinal test before Smith, applies. It is at this point that the
government employee context becomes relevant.
To start, when analyzing the first Sherbert v. Verner question regarding
the burden on religious exercise, the first government employee question-
is it pursuant to official duties-is critical. That is, when analyzing whether
a law imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise, it should matter
whether it is private religious practice or government religious practice. If the
practice is pursuant to the government employee's official duties and
therefore best seen as government religion, it is the Establishment Clause
189. See Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
190. See, e.g., Miller v. Drennon, No. 91-2166, 1992 WL 137578, at *4 (4th Cir. June 19,
1992) ("In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment is not violated by a neutral,
'generally applicable and otherwise valid provision' which does not as its object prohibit the
exercise of religion. Because it is clear that the County implemented the policy to reduce costs
and more fairly apportion work and not to prohibit the exercise of religion, Miller's claim that the
scheduling policy violated his first amendment rights must fail." (citation omitted)).
191. Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(holding that the no-religious-garb policy "is not neutral in effect, and does not pretend to be").
192. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365
(3d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e conclude that the Department's decision to provide medical exemptions
while refusing religious exemptions is sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to
trigger heightened scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi.").
193. The Sherbert v. Verner test is named after the case that first articulated this free exercise
doctrine, Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398 (1963).
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(and the Equal Protection Clause) and not the Free Exercise Clause that courts
need to worry about.19 4
As for the second Sherbert v. Verner question, strict scrutiny may be
inappropriate when the government acts as employer as well as sovereign.
The Supreme Court has been very clear that the government's powers as
employer are more extensive than its powers as sovereign.1 95 For example,
while the government as sovereign has little justification for curtailing
citizens' rudeness, as employer it should be able to punish its employees who
are rude to the public they are supposed to serve.1 96 That is, as an employer,
the government ought to have some managerial prerogatives.1 97 Private
employers, after all, exercise tremendous control over their workplaces.1 98
"Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of
control over their employees' words and actions; without it, there would be
little chance for the efficient provision of public services."1 99 Thus, strict
194. As a matter of doctrine, the first question in Sherbert v. Verner is whether a substantial
burden has been imposed on the government employee's ability to practice their religion.
However, as explained, if the religious act in question is official conduct, then it is government
religious conduct and not protected by the Free Exercise Clause. In other words, the pursuant to
official duties question still acts as an initial threshold inquiry, it just happens to help answer the
first Sherbert v. Verner question. Just as it screened out claims in the free speech context, the
pursuant to official duties inquiry would screen out claims in the religious liberty context.
195. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) ("[T]he government as
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign." (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the government's
mission as employer.").
196. See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 183 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The First Amendment does
not require a Government employer to sit idly by while its employees insult those they are hired
to serve and protect.").
197. Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 213 (2008) ("As Arthur Goldberg
once put it, the concept of management rights is simply 'a recognition of the fact that somebody
must be the boss. . .. People can't be wandering around at loose ends, each deciding what to do
next. Management decides what the employee is to do."' (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment:
The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 583 (1998)
("[G]ovemment is entitled to insist that its employees not behave in ways that prevent
management from running the workplace as it sees fit.").
198. Pauline Kim points out that the analogy between private employee and public employee
is far from perfect. Kim, supra note 17, at 607 (criticizing the "trend toward referencing private
sector norms to interpret public employees' constitutional rights of speech and privacy"). Still, it
is hard to avoid the Court's conclusion that a workplace cannot function if every employment
dispute becomes a federal case.
199. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Of course, no employer has carte blanche: Title VII
bars religious discrimination and requires reasonable religious accommodations, but only if the
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scrutiny, a test designed for the government-sovereign, may be too
demanding for measures taken in its government-employer incarnation.2 00
Even as the government-sovereign, the government's interests in
regulating its employees differ from its interests in regulating its citizens.
That is, vis-A-vis its employees, the government has special needs as
sovereign as well as employer. That is because to some extent (or more
accurately, to varying extents), the government employee also represents or
embodies the government. Their speech and acts may be attributed, and in
certain circumstances will be attributed, to the state in a way that citizen
speech and acts are not.
This concern is greatest when the employee is acting pursuant to official
duties, especially if they engage with the public while discharging these
duties. 201 To the public, a government employee acting in their official
capacity is the government, and, as discussed earlier, the employee's actions
amount to state action.202 In those instances, when the employee stands in for
the government, the government must be mindful of the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses.
In short, to strictly scrutinize every government employer decision may
not adequately incorporate the government's interests. First, the government
as employer needs some managerial control. After all, "[w]hen someone who
is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation
begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective operation,
the government employer must have some power to restrain her." 20 3 Second,
the government as sovereign must ensure compliance with the Constitution:
accommodation does not amount to an undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2
(2012).
200. The special circumstances of academic freedom at public universities, which Garcetti
reserved judgment on, are beyond the scope of this Article. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 ("We need
not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.").
201. Notably, when someone sues a government employee in their official capacity, the suit
is treated as a claim against the government. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) ("[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against
the [government] entity."). Granted this is a different area of law, but it illustrates that the
conflation of an employee's official acts and the state is not unique to the government-employee
speech context.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (explaining that generally the actions of
public employees discharging their official duties will be treated as the state for state action
purposes).
203. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion).
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When a public employee, in their official capacity, says or does things that
violates the Constitution, the government must be able to respond.204
Lower courts have not been blind to the unique context of public employee
religion. As noted earlier, these courts have opted for one of two possible
modifications to the existing free exercise doctrine. 2 05 A few decisions, such
as a Third Circuit opinion written by then-Judge Alito, have applied
intermediate rather than strict scrutiny after finding that a non-neutral law
imposed a substantial religious burden: "While Smith and Lukumi speak in
terms of strict scrutiny ... we will assume that an intermediate level of
scrutiny applies since this case arose in the public employment context and
since the Department's actions cannot survive even that level of scrutiny." 2 06
Other courts have adopted the government employee speech inquiry,
though notably these decisions predate Garcetti. Thus, in a free exercise
challenge to a library dress code that barred religious jewelry, one district
court adopted a "Pickering-like standard of review, "207 arguing that the
"policy justifications for applying a less stringent standard of review in the
governmental employment arena are every bit as compelling in the free
exercise context as in the free speech context." 208 The Eighth Circuit,
addressing a social worker's challenge to a rule barring him from
proselytizing his clients, expressed a similar sentiment:
Although the free exercise of religion is certainly a fundamental
constitutional right, we believe that the Supreme Court might well
204. Whether an employee is acting pursuant to official duties matters for both Sherbert v.
Verner inquiries. First, if the religious conduct is government conduct, then there is no substantial
burden on individual religious liberty. Second, if the religious act is essentially the government's
act, then the government's compelling interest in complying with the Establishment Clause and
Equal Protection Clause comes into play.
205. Occasionally a court will reject strict scrutiny without being absolutely clear which of
these two it is adopting. See, e.g., Finnie v. Lee County, 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 767-68 (N.D. Miss.
2012).
206. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366
n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Lewis v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418,
454 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[C]ourts outside this jurisdiction have held that an intermediate level of
scrutiny applies, instead of the strict scrutiny set forth in Lukumi Babalu Aye, when a Free
Exercise challenge is directed at a non-neutral rule imposed by the government as an employer,
as opposed to a rule applicable to the general public."); Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28,
268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ("Public employers enjoy somewhat more leeway, but
not carte blanch, in regulating the speech and other First Amendment activities of their employees.
'Heightened' or 'intermediate' level scrutiny generally applies in the public sector . . . .").
207. Draper v. Logan Cty. Pub. Library, 403 F. Supp. 2d 608, 622 (W.D. Ky. 2005) ("[T]he
Court concludes that the Sixth Circuit would apply a Pickering-like standard of review to free
exercise challenges to conduct rules of a governmental employer.").
208. Id.
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adopt, for free exercise cases that arise in the context of public
employment, an analysis like the one enunciated in Pickering v.
Board ofEducation. That case dealt with free speech rather than the
free exercise of religion, but because the analogy is such a close
one, and because we see no essential relevant differences between
those rights, we shall endeavor to apply the principles of Pickering
to the case at hand.209
Under either approach, strict scrutiny is replaced by a test that better
addresses the efficiency needs of the government-employer and the
constitutional limits on the government-sovereign. Besides aligning more
with government employee speech, the government employee religion
approach is more rigorous than the intermediate scrutiny approach. If the
religious practice is pursuant to official duties, then it is a government
religious practice and consequently no private religious practice has been
burdened, substantially or otherwise. There is no free exercise claim, and no
scrutiny is required. One might come to the same conclusion regardless, but
the pursuant to official duties lens makes the conclusion inevitable. In
addition, as with government employee speech, the government employee's
autonomy interests are not enough to warrant protection. Their challenged
conduct must be on a matter of public interest and have that public-regarding
benefit. Again, intermediate scrutiny does not preclude this, but the matter of
public interest test requires it. 2 10
The argument that a government employee religion doctrine is not really
necessary may have some traction with religious refusal cases, since these
usually involve neutral laws of general applicability. 211 Still, not all refusals
do, and furthermore religion refusals do not describe the universe of
government employee religion. A government employer religion doctrine
ensures that the government's unique interests vis-a'-vis government
employees, both as employer and as sovereign, are adequately balanced
against First Amendment interests.
209. Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
210. Intermediate scrutiny is a form of balancing of interests, and the Pickering balancing
test is essentially a structured intermediate scrutiny where the interests have been preset.
211. If citizens must comply with a neutral law of general applicability, then surely
government employees must.
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2. Religious Liberty in the Age of RFRAs
A second question is whether a government employee religion doctrine is
relevant for Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) claims. 2 12 Because
a plaintiff is more likely to succeed under the federal RFRA or a state RFRA
than under the Free Exercise Clause, many of the most important recent
religious liberty challenges are RFRA rather than Free Exercise cases.213
Nevertheless, the constitutional doctrine is still relevant for statutory RFRA
claims for two reasons. The first reason, which may or may not survive the
Supreme Court's recent Hobby Lobby decision,214 is that RFRA was meant to
track pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause doctrine. Second, even if RFRA
represents a break with the Free Exercise Clause, the same concerns that
shape the constitutional government employee religion analysis should
inform the RFRA analysis.
a. The Rise ofRFRA
Congress passed RFRA in direct response to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,2 15 the Supreme Court
decision that weakened free exercise protection. 216 Recall that before Smith's
"neutral and generally applicable" rule, religious observers were, at least in
theory, constitutionally entitled to exemptions from any law that substantially
212. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012).
213. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (RFRA); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA); Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)
(RLUIPA); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (RLUIPA). RLUIPA, which stands for
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, mirrors RFRA except that it is only
available for the claims listed in its title. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a) to (b)(2) (2012). There have
been a couple of major Free Exercise Clause cases. For example, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (affirming existence of ministerial
exception and therefore rejecting school teacher's ADA claim), focused on church autonomy
rather than individual religious liberty. The ramifications of this term's Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that churches must be allowed to
compete on an equal basis for cash grants from the government), are not yet clear.
214. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
215. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REv. 209, 210-12 (1994) (explaining how RFRA was
passed in direct reaction to Employment Division v. Smith).
216. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (holding that neutral laws of general applicability, such as
the U.S. drug laws that prohibited the sacramental use of peyote, did not have to pass strict
scrutiny in order to comply with the Free Exercise Clause); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 2
(1993) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] ("The Smith majority's abandonment of strict scrutiny
represented an abrupt, unexpected rejection of longstanding Supreme Court precedent.").
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burdened their religious practice unless that law passed strict scrutiny.2 17
RFRA restored as a matter of statutory law the earlier Sherbert v. Verner
test.2 18 While the federal RFRA applies to federal laws, 2 19 many states have
their own version of RFRA that applies to state laws. 2 20
In terms of litigation, a RFRA suit may be a government employee's best
bet for securing a religious accommodation in the workplace. Free Exercise
Clause accommodations are not available from neutral laws of general
applicability. 221 Title VII accommodations are not granted if they impose
undue hardship on the employer.222 While Title VII's standard sounds
protective, anything other than a minimal disruption amounts to "undue
hardship."22 3 In contrast, RFRA mandates accommodations from all laws that
impose a substantial religious burden unless the law passes strict scrutiny.
Thus, RFRA lawsuits may be the religious claims of the future.224
217. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
218. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012) ("Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest.").
219. The Supreme Court has held that while Congress may subject its own federal laws to
RFRA's requirements, Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it attempted to apply
them to state laws. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
220. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4,
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. (noting
that between 1993 and 2015, "21 states have enacted state RFRAs"). One or two new state laws
explicitly give government employees a religious right to refuse to perform their official duties,
see supra notes 7, 101, but in most states, public employees with religious liberty claims would
rely on their state RFRA.
221. They are also not available for federal employees whose claims mirror Title VII
religious discrimination claims. See supra note 181 (explaining when Title VII preempts Free
Exercise Clause claims).
222. Title VII not only prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, but it also requires
that employers grant reasonable accommodations for religious employees unless the
accommodation creates "undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (religious accommodation
required unless "employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business").
223. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) ("To require [defendant]
to bear more than a de minimis cost . . . is an undue hardship."). Title VII claims must also meet
strict statute of limitations. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as
a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 866 (2008) ("At the root of the problem for
rights-claiming under Title VII is the statute's unusually short statute of limitations.").
224. Though perhaps not for federal employees if Title VII is held to preempt RFRA as well
as the Free Exercise Clause, as a few courts before Hobby Lobby have held. See supra note 181.
However, Hobby Lobby could easily be read to suggest RFRA should not be treated in the same
way as the Free Exercise Clause. See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
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b. RFRA and Free Exercise
Because RFRA was meant to track the Free Exercise Clause, the
constitutional government employer religion doctrine should influence the
statute's application. As the "Restoration" in the name indicates, RFRA was
designed to restore the Sherbert v. Verner free exercise test for its religious
liberty claims. "RFRA's purpose is specific and written into the statute itself.
The Act was crafted to 'restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to guarantee its application
in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.' "225 In
addition, RFRA's statement of purpose discusses religious liberty in terms of
the Free Exercise Clause, noting that "the framers of the Constitution,
recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution." 2 26 In fact, the original
statute defined "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion under the
First Amendment to the Constitution." 2 27 RFRA's legislative history likewise
links the scope of its protection to the protection offered under the Free
Exercise Clause. 228 RFRA's close relationship to the Free Exercise Clause is
therefore one reason why a constitutional government employee religion
doctrine is relevant for RFRA claims.
225. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012)); see also id. ("The legislative history
is correspondingly emphatic on RFRA's aim. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-111, p. 12
(1993) ... (RFRA's purpose was 'only to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Smith,' not
to 'unsettle other areas of the law.'); 139 Cong. Rec. 26178 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(RFRA was 'designed to restore the compelling interest test for deciding free exercise claims.').").
226. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (2012).
227. Pub. L. No. 103-141 § 5, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993). Congress later redefined "exercise
of religion." RFRA was amended in 2000, so that "exercise of religion" is now defined, by cross
reference to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), as "any exercise
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central, to a system of religious belief." RFRA, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012); RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). However, the
language was changed to make clear that a religious practice need not be mandatory or central to
one's faith in order to be protected. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Brown, J., concurring) ("This change was meant to 'clarify[] issues that had generated litigation
under RFRA' by providing that '[r]eligious exercise need not be compulsory or central to the
claimant's religious belief system."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
228. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) ("The Committee expects that the courts will look
to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether the exercise of
religion has been substantially burdened . . . ."); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 216, at 6-7 ("It is the
Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of religion cases decided prior
to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened . . . .").
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Despite this backdrop, the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby suggests that
RFRA is more of a break from than restoration of constitutional doctrine.22 9
Although the four-Justice Hobby Lobby dissent describes this view as "not
plausible," 23 0 it currently controls.
c. Informing RFRA Analysis
Even if RFRA breaks with its constitutional counterpart, the concerns
incorporated into government employee doctrine apply to the RFRA analysis.
With regard to RFRA's first question, whether the challenged law imposes a
substantial religious burden on a government employee, it should matter if
the religious exercise is pursuant to official duties. If so, if it occurs as part
and parcel of the employee's governmental responsibilities, it is best seen as
the government's religious exercise and there is no substantial religious
burden-the government cannot be religiously burdened. On the contrary, if
confronted with a social worker who feels religiously compelled to
proselytize to their clients, the courts ought to be more focused on limiting
religious exercise rather than facilitating it.231
In fact, although the district court did not explicitly rely on the pursuant to
official duties test to dismiss claims of substantial religious burden, the fact
that Kim Davis complained about official job responsibilities informed its
RFRA analysis. 23 2 Rather than provide marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, which contravened her Apostolic Christian faith, Kim Davis stopped
issuing them altogether.233 In its First Amendment analysis, the court noted
that because Davis's "refusal to issue marriage licenses[] is a product of her
official duties, it likely is not entitled to First Amendment protection."234 The
court's RFRA analysis echoes these sentiments, rejecting Davis's RFRA
claim on the grounds that "her religious convictions cannot excuse her from
229. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62 ("In RLUIPA, in an obvious effort to effect a
complete separation from First Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First
Amendment and defined the 'exercise of religion' to include 'any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.' § 2000cc-5(7)(A).").
230. Id. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231. Likewise, a court evaluating the burden on an employee who refuses on religious
grounds to provide a government service to a protected class might be dealing with government
action that violates the Equal Protection Clause. See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text
for more discussion.
232. The statutory claim was brought under Kentucky's version of RFRA. Miller v. Davis,
123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (noting that the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act is
"patterned after the federal RFRA").
233. Id. at 929.
234. Id. at 942.
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performing the duties that she took an oath to perform as Rowan County
Clerk." 23 5
Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B.1, even though RFRA requires strict
scrutiny for laws that do impose a substantial burden, the government's
interests as employer and as sovereign ought to inform that analysis, and
perhaps render it somewhat less strict. There is precedent for a more relaxed
strict scrutiny in certain circumstances. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,23 6 the Supreme
Court held that in applying the strict scrutiny required by RLUIPA (RFRA's
counterpart for prisoners and other institutionalized people), courts should be
deferential to government prison officials.237 In other words, the strict
scrutiny should not be all that strict in that particular context. 238
What about the argument that RFRA was designed to exceed free exercise
protections, and therefore the strict scrutiny standard ought to stand
regardless of what happens constitutionally? Even if it were true that RFRA
was meant to provide more protection than pre-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence (itself debatable), this assumes that government employees
should receive the exact same expanded RFRA protection as citizens. But as
described above, the government has particular needs vis-A-vis its employees,
both as employer and as sovereign. In sum, comparison with government
employee speech should illuminate how RFRA is applied to government
employee religion.
III. CRITICISM
I have not yet addressed the elephant in the room, which is that
government employee doctrine, especially Garcetti's pursuant to official
duties threshold, is widely criticized. The categorical exclusion of any free
speech protection for government employees who speak pursuant to theirjobs
has been the target of numerous scholarly attacks.239 Nonetheless, Garcetti's
235. Id. at 944.
236. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
237. First, the Court observed that "[w]hile the Act adopts a 'compelling governmental
interest' standard, '[c]ontext matters' in the application of that standard." Id. at 722-23 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). It then essentially advised courts to apply it "with 'due deference
to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators . . . .' Id. at 723 (citation
omitted).
238. David M. Shapiro, To Seek aNewer World: Prisoners'Rights at the Frontier, 114 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 124, 126 (2016) (noting that, in Cutter, "the Court bled [RLUIPA] of
much of its force. .. . [and] the Court's unanimous opinion . .. suggested that strict scrutiny under
RLUIPA was not 'real' strict scrutiny").
239. See, e.g., Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2013) (lamenting that Garcetti "has brought constitutional
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main flaw does not translate to the government employee religion context.
Responding to one criticism, though, raises another possible one: If speech
and religion are not sufficiently analogous for the Garcetti criticism to stick,
perhaps they are also not analogous enough for the government employee
speech doctrine as a whole to apply to government employee religion claims.
A. The Garcetti Critique
1. Criticism
Thus far, the Article has accepted the government employee speech
doctrine as a descriptive and as a normative matter. However, much criticism
has been levied against the doctrine, especially the Supreme Court's Garcetti
decision. 240 The most common complaint is that labeling all speech made
pursuant to official duties as government speech leaves unprotected a great
protection close to its nineteenth-century level" especially given public employee speech's role
in "maintain[ing] a system of internal checks on government in addition to the external checks
imposed by legislatures, courts, and the public").
240. Roosevelt, supra note 17, at 636 ("[A]cademic reaction to Garcetti has been largely
negative."); see also Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1471 (2007) (criticizing Garcetti by asking
"[b]ut why are public employees not acting as citizens when they speak out about government
misconduct, waste, or dishonesty in the course of doing theirjobs?"); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public
Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing, and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (describing Garcetti as "unsound as a matter of First
Amendment policy because it under-protects public employee speech that is vital to self-
government"); Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENY. U. L.
REV. 899, 911 (2010) ("Garcetti empowers the government to punish public employees simply
for doing their jobs when those workers have been hired to flag hazards and improprieties."); Paul
M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees,
7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 117 (2008) (Garcetti has "made it nearly impossible for
conscientious public servants to speak out in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing
their careers."); Caroline A. Flynn, Note, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue
Exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 MICH. L. REV. 759, 772 (2013) ("In short, Garcetti was
wrongly decided. . . . The decision's shortcomings stemmed, in part, from the majority's failure
to appreciate how a public employee can occupy more than one role while speaking."); Shubha
Harris, Note, Case Note: Silencing the Noise of Democracy-the Supreme Court Denies First
Amendment Protection for Public Employees'Job-Related Statements in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 33
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1144-45 (2007) ("While in recent years Congress and the
American public have been calling for increased protections for employees who speak out about
government wrongdoing, the Garcetti Court made a marked move in the opposite direction.");
Sarah F. Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech Rights ofPublic Employees Under
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 392 (2008) ("[T]he Garcetti rule is least likely
to afford First Amendment protection where it is arguably most warranted.").
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deal of speech on a matter of public concern. "The academic reaction to
[Garcetti] has been harshly negative; scholars argue that the holding will
prevent the public from learning of governmental misconduct that is known
only to those working within the bowels of the government itself." 241
Government employee speech is valued and protected in large part
because public employees are thought to have a particularly well-informed
perspective on their government work. 24 2 "[P]ublic employees 'are uniquely
qualified to comment' on 'matters concerning government policies that are
of interest to the public at large. "'243
However, this insight seemed to vanish when the Garcetti Court held that
speech pursuant to official duties was never protected, even if on a matter of
public interest. The speech that might be most useful to the public-speech
on government activities by those who, because of their job, know these
activities inside out-is precisely that speech now deemed beyond the
purview of the Free Speech Clause.
Utterly failing to protect speech pursuant to official duties is especially
problematic for democratic accountability. 244 A foundational justification for
protecting speech is to ensure democratic self-governance. Crucial to self-
governance is the ability to hold government officials accountable for their
actions. Yet this ability is compromised when potential whistleblowers-
public employees-are discouraged from reporting government misdeeds.24 5
As Helen Louise Norton summarized, the Garcetti rule "frustrates a
meaningful commitment to republican government because it allows
government officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other on-
the-job speech that would otherwise inform voters' views and facilitate their
ability to hold the government politically accountable for its choices."24 6
241. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law ofManagerial Prerogative,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 36 (2008).
242. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) ("Underlying the decision
in Pickering is the recognition that public employees are often the members of the community
who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations
which are of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the
community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues.").
243. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (citation omitted).
244. Kim, supra note 17, at 642 ("Because political accountability is the primary means by
which the public seeks to ensure that public managers are pursuing public goals, speech by public
employees plays a particularly important role in self-govemance.").
245. Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 975, 993 (2013) (Post-Garcetti, "[i]ndividuals who have a professional obligation to
expose government wrongdoing have great incentive to turn a blind eye to objectionable practices,
because the First Amendment will provide them no protection.").
246. Norton, supra note 17, at 4.
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Richard Ceballos himself is a cautionary tale. He attempted to report a
faulty affidavit to his supervisors in the district attorney's office, and was
demoted for his troubles. 247 Nor is his case unique. 248 "In fact, in the years
following Garcetti, the lower federal courts denied protection to numerous
government employees who objected to their employers' illegal practices,
health and safety violations, and financial improprieties." 24 9 In case after case,
courts have dismissed the government whistleblower's First Amendment
claim because the speech was pursuant to official responsibilities.25 0
2. Response
A few scholars have argued that the blow to democratic accountability has
been overstated. One commentator, for example, argues that Garcetti's
impact is limited because "[i]nternal workplace speech . . . does not improve
the public's understanding of the functions of government or otherwise
enhance the effectiveness of the process of political accountability." 251
247. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413-15, 443 n.14 (2006).
248. Norton & Citron, supra note 240, at 911 ("[L]ower courts now routinely rely on
[Garcetti] to dispose of the constitutional claims of government workers fired after making job-
required reports of illegal or dangerous conditions despite the great value of such speech to the
public.").
249. Kim, supra note 17, at 644; see Strasser, supra note 245, at 993 ("Regrettably, lower
courts have learned the lessons of Garcetti quite well. Numerous individuals have suffered
adverse employment actions when seeking to expose the kinds of practices that whistleblower
protections are designed to bring to light."); see also, e.g., O'Shell v. Cline, 571 F. App'x 487,
491 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding auditor's speech unprotected because "[a]s an auditor, O'Shell's job
was to report observed financial improprieties."); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918,
919 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming that the District Manager of a county public water supply district,
whose position was eliminated after expressing concern that that a leaking septic tank still posed
a contamination risk, could not bring First Amendment claim because speech was pursuant to
official duties).
250. See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he reports of
the inspectors to their supervisors about sewer overflows they were required to investigate are not
protected under the First Amendment."); Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2007)
("[W]e find that Vose's speech [regarding police misconduct], albeit an honorable attempt to
correct alleged wrongdoing, was not protected by the First Amendment."); Battle v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Plaintiffs speech to FVSU officials about
inaccuracies and signs of fraud in student files was made pursuant to her official employment
responsibilities.").
251. Rosenthal, supra note 241, at 56; see also id. at 38 ("The critics' claim that Garcetti
undervalues the role of whistleblowers in enhancing the quality of public discussion and debate
is misconceived because Garcetti is not properly understood as a whistleblower case. Ceballos
did not take his case against the District Attorney's office to the public . . . .").
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Moreover, government employees who speak to the press, or otherwise make
their concerns known to the public, are still generally protected.252
This debate, however, is beside the point for religious liberty claims
because the accountability concern is absent from the government employee
religion context. As discussed in Part II.B., public employees' religion claims
often do not involve matters of public concern as opposed to matters of
private interest. Furthermore, even if their conduct qualifies as expressing a
religious viewpoint-which is a matter of public concern-it does not convey
the type of information that helps keep the government accountable to the
people it is meant to represent. In short, people's individual practice of
religion does not further democratic self-government in the way that speech
about the government does. As a consequence, the major criticism levied
against the government employee speech doctrine is simply inapplicable to a
parallel government employee religion doctrine.
B. The Speech and Religion Are Too Different Critique
1. Criticism
Given this disjunction between speech and religion, perhaps the two
rights, the right to free speech and the right to religious liberty, are too
disparate to simply adopt the doctrine of one for the other. In other words,
perhaps the two are really not analogous, and should not be treated as such.
In particular, the critique continues, the Free Exercise Clause protects
different interests than the Free Speech Clause. Protecting public employee
speech may be about improving public discourse, but protecting public
employee religious practice is about respecting individual conscience. While
the lack of public-regarding benefit explains why the main Garcetti criticism
is not an obstacle for government employee religion, it also suggests that the
"public concern" requirement, however relevant it may be for speech, is not
appropriate for religion, especially since it results in inadequate protection
for public employees' religious exercise.
2. Response
Although speech and religion claims by public employees are not
identical, they are more than distant cousins. First, the government interests
252. Id. at 57 ("For public employees who take their concerns to the public, Garcetti should
pose no bar to First Amendment protection . . . .").
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are essentially the same. Second, the First Amendment interests are mostly
the same: Although there are additional reasons to protect speech, the First
Amendment protects both speech and religion as a means of furthering
individual autonomy. Thus, it is inaccurate to say that speech protection is
about public debate and not private conscience. It is both. Notably, only the
former is considered weighty enough to protect in the government employee
context.
What might be the doctrinal consequences of being mostly but not exactly
the same? The second subsection below sketches out the two options. One
option is to apply the existing government employee speech doctrine "as is"
to government employee religion claims. If only matters of public interest
merit First Amendment protection for the one, the same should be true for the
other. The alternative option is to eliminate the "public concern" test for
religion but not speech. 253 This differentiation between government employee
religion and government employee speech might be justified if the autonomy
interests of speech and religion differ in strength or kind-which is an open
question.
a. Government Interests
Whether in its role as employer supervising a workplace or as sovereign
subject to the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, the government's
interests in both government employee speech and government employee
religion cases are basically the same.
The government-employer's need to exercise control over the workplace
does not change when an employee is asserting a religious as opposed to a
speech right.254 A disruptive employee is a disruptive employee, whether the
disruption is caused by speech or religion.
Moreover, the democratic dimensions to these disturbances described by
the Supreme Court are similar. "[E]fficient administration of legislatively
authorized programs reflects the constitutional need effectively to implement
the public's democratically determined will." 255 That is, it is not just any
workplace that is being disrupted, but a government workplace in the process
253. A third option would be eliminate the "public concern" test, which fails to recognize
employees' autonomy interests, for both speech and religion, but this Article takes free speech
doctrine as a given.
254. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing how the government as
employer must be able to exercise control over its workplace).
255. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 445 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of enacting the electorate's will. This need to ensure that the government
agency does its appointed or delegated duties applies in both types of cases.256
Also applicable to both claims is the Supreme Court worry that giving
courts the power to review personnel decisions could potentially upset the
balance of power among the three branches of government. Garcetti justified
its rule in part by arguing that a "contrary rule . . . would commit state and
federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial
oversight of communications between and among government employees
and their superiors in the course of official business."257 In particular, the
Court worried that this continuing oversight could result in judicial
overreaching: "To hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial
intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree
inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of
powers."2 58
Whether these concerns are well-founded is beyond the scope of this
Article. Rather, the main point is that to the extent these concerns are present
or absent, they are not present or absent to different degrees in public
employee speech and public employee religion claims.
Similarly, the government's interests in avoiding potential Establishment
Clause or Equal Protection Clause violations exists whether the claim is
based on speech or religious conduct. (If anything, the Establishment Clause
concerns are stronger with government employee religion. Public employees
practicing religion pursuant to their official duties amounts to government
religion, or at least government-sponsored religion, and should trigger
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 25 9 Whatever its shortcomings in the speech
context, the pursuant to official duties test is important in the religion
context.)
256. Describing the Court's reasoning, Cynthia Estlund wrote:
In a sense, democracy itself depends on public officials being empowered to
direct and evaluate how employees perform their jobs. It is all well and good
for voters to elect officials and express policy preferences, but those
democratic processes do not amount to much unless those elected and
appointed officials can implement those policies.
Estlund, supra note 240, at 1472.
257. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
258. Id.
259. Whether a government social worker who preaches to their clients is treated as
government proselytization or government-endorsed proselytization, it violates the Establishment
Clause. See supra note 76 (discussing cases where government-sponsored private speech violated
the Establishment Clause).
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All in all, the government's interests in government employee religion
cases mirror its interests in government employee speech cases.
Consequently, if the analogy fails, it is not due to dissimilarities in the
government's interests.
b. First Amendment Interests
It is the interests on the other side that do not match up. In general, we
protect individuals' right to speak for the sake of both the individual speaker
and the public. As explained in Part II.A.2, two of the three main free speech
justifications-promoting a marketplace of ideas and facilitating democratic
self-governance-are audience focused. The justifications for individual
religious practice lack an explicitly audience-focused benefit.260 Some might
claim that society as a whole profits because increased individual religious
practice leads to greater societal morality. 261 This is, however, a highly
contested proposition.2 62 As evidenced by the religious arguments both for
260. I set aside the benefits of institutional religion, since government employee religion does
not implicate it. In any event, most of the public benefits of religious associations are no different
than the public benefits of nonreligious ones. For example, both religious and nonreligious
voluntary associations "foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the
power of the State." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
261. George Washington, for example, wrote, "[R]eason and experience both forbid us to
expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." George Washington,
Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1976), in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 512, 521
(W.B. Allen ed., 1988). In fact, empirical evidence for a causal link between religious belief and
moral behavior is inconsistent. See Jean Decety et al., The Negative Association Between
Religiousness and Children's Altruism Across the World, 25 CURRENT BIOLOGY 2951, 2951
(2015) ("Across all countries, parents in religious house-holds reported that their children
expressed more empathy and sensitivity for justice in everyday life than non-religious parents.
However, religiousness was inversely predictive of children's altruism and positively correlated
with their punitive tendencies."); Luke W. Galen, Does Religious BeliefPromote Prosociality? A
Critical Examination, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 876, 876 (2012) ("This article critiques evidence
regarding this 'religious prosociality' hypothesis from several areas of the literature."); Wilhelm
Hofmann et al., Morality in Everyday Life, 345 SCIENCE 1340, 1340 (2014) ("Religious and
nonreligious participants did not differ in the likelihood or quality of committed moral and
immoral acts."); Gregory S. Paul, Cross-National Correlations of Quantifiable Societal Health
with Popular Religiosity and Secularism in the Prosperous Democracies, 7 J. RELIGION & Soc'Y
1 (2005) ("Data correlations show that in almost all regards the highly secular democracies
consistently enjoy low rates of societal dysfunction, while pro-religious and anti-evolution
America performs poorly.").
262. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (2005)
("Religious entities have the capacity for great good and great evil .... ); Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1265 (1994) ("[W]hile religion sponsors
the highest forms of community, compassion, love, and sacrifice, one need only look around the
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and against racial equality during the civil rights movement, 263 religion can
be a force for good264 Or ill. 265 In fact, because one person's morality can be
another person's immorality, 266 agreement on what counts as beneficial social
outcomes can itself be elusive. In any event, even if individual religious
practice netted a social benefit, it is indirect and attenuated, unlike the direct
benefit of a free flow of information provided by individual free speech. In
the end, then, unlike speech, individual religious exercise is protected
primarily for the sake of the religious individual alone. 267 Thus, although
religion and speech promote individual autonomy, only speech provides
immediate public benefits.
i) Apply the Same Test
Two alternative conclusions may be drawn about the applicability of the
government employee speech doctrine to government employer religion
doctrine given this mismatch. The first is that the claims are still similar
enough that the government employee speech doctrine should apply "as is"
in the religion context. The bottom line is that although employees do not
forfeit all of their First Amendment rights when they enter government
world, or probe our own history, to recognize that it also sponsors discord, hate, intolerance, and
violence.").
263. Enola G. Aird, Toward A Renaissance for the African-American Family: Confronting
the Lie ofBlack Inferiority, 58 EMoRY L.J. 7, 20 (2008) ("Just as law and religion worked hand-
in-hand to support the dehumanization and enslavement of African people, they also worked
together to promote abolition and build the civil rights movement.").
264. Claire McCusker, When Church and State Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection
in a Post-Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 391, 396 (2007) ("The role of religion in
abolitionism and the passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the
temperance movement and the Eighteenth Amendment, female suffrage and the Nineteenth
Amendment, and the civil rights movement and the repeal of Jim Crow laws is well documented
by scholars.").
265. William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief
and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 669, 671 (2011) ("Even
after the Thirteenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, abolished slavery, some religious leaders
continued to invoke biblical arguments for slavery . . .. [and] [a]ntimiscegenation was justified
on religious grounds . . . ."); Daniel Gordon, Gender, Race and Limiting the Constitutional
Privilege of Religion as a Haven for Bias: The Bridge Back to the Twentieth Century, 31
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 369, 377-79 (2010) (describing theological justifications for slavery and
segregation).
266. The clash between those whose faith condemns same-sex marriages and those whose
faith condemns this view as bigotry is a contemporary example. People's views of abortion are
similarly split.
267. As mentioned earlier, the pragmatic argument for allowing religious practice-to
promote civil peace-does not apply in the civil service context. See supra text accompanying
notes 129-130.
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service, at work they lose constitutional protection to speak their mind and
practice their religion unless it is a matter of public concern. As the Supreme
Court has observed, "[W]here matters of purely private significance are at
issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous." 268 In particular,
protection is less rigorous for public employees when the employee's speech
or religion-however much it might further their own autonomy-does not
directly benefit the citizenry. 269
Since the benefits of individual religious practice usually accrue only to
the individual, government employee religion claims may regularly fail under
this regime. 27 0 They may fail even when the religious practice (such as
avoiding contact with pork) injures neither the workplace nor the public
because harmless religious practice that is not expressive-and conduct often
is not-will not satisfy the public concern test. Thus, wholesale adoption of
the government speech doctrine, where employees' speech and religion rights
are not protected by the First Amendment if they do not involve a matter of
public concern, may underprotect government employee religion.
Perhaps this worry is overstated. Many religious practices actually are
expressive either because they involve speech or because they involve
conduct with an expressive dimension. For example, courts have held that
wearing religious garb amounts to expressive conduct. 27 1 Moreover, public
employees would not be left without religious protection: Like private
employees, Title VII covers them. If their religious practice does not create
an undue hardship, then they are legally entitled to a Title VII
accommodation. Finally, one might respond, public employees are not worse
off than private employees,2 72 and the fact of the matter is that what you can
268. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) ("We have long recognized that not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that
is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."' (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
269. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 ("[R]estricting speech on purely private matters does not
implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest:
'[T]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference
with a meaningful dialogue of ideas' . . . ." (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
270. The odds improve if the claim also involves speech, i.e., religious speech or religious
conduct that is expressive. In that case, the religious practice/expression is more likely to meet
the "matter of public concern" threshold.
271. Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 536, 559 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
272. Roosevelt, supra note 17, at 637 ("If we compare public employees to private
employees, rather than to private citizens, the public employees actually look better off in terms
of protection for speech." (emphasis added)); see also Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional
Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of
Government Employees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
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do at work is not the same as what you can do outside work. 273 "Yes, speech
is a nice means of self-actualization .... But private sector employees get
along well enough without [constitutional speech protection], and it seems a
little bit strange that speech protection should be, in effect, a perk of
government employment." 27 4 Consequently, "[f]rom the speaker-centered
perspective, the rationale for prohibiting employment decisions based on
speech is not at all clear." 27 5 Similar reasoning applies to extra religion
protection.27 6
Still, not all religious practices are expressive (or express something on a
matter of public concern) and some fairly harmless ones might not qualify
for Title VII accommodation if they create more than de minimis costs. Thus,
the possibility remains that the public concern test forces some to choose
between their faith and public employment, and hardworking, devout people
could find themselves precluded from government positions.
ii) Alter the Test by Dropping the Public Concern Requirement
The alternative would be to drop the public concern requirement for First
Amendment religion claims. 277 The requirement does not, as suggested
797, 816 (2007) ("Public employees should not gain additional rights that private employees do
not have.").
273. This is obviously a simplification, as certain off-duty speech might be subject to the
government employee speech doctrine if it risks disrupting the workplace. See, e.g., City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (per curiam) (upholding termination of police officer who
wore police uniform in off-duty sex tape for sale). However, it is beyond the scope of this Article
to draw the line between "at work" and "outside of work." See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea,
The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117.
274. Roosevelt, supra note 17, at 642; see also id. at 649 ("[I]f the only interest at stake is
that of the individual employee-if we adopt a speaker-centered view of the First Amendment-
the case for any First Amendment rights against the employer strikes me as weak.").
275. Id.
276. I say "extra" because Title VII, which covers private and government employees,
provides a measure of protection for religious exercise.
277. Rejecting the government employee speech doctrine as a model for government
employee religion is another possibility. Yet a complete abandonment of the government
employee speech doctrine goes too far, even if the interests underlying speech and religion do not
exactly align. Public employees who practice religion pursuant to their official duties amounts to
government religion, or at least government-sponsored religion, and should trigger Establishment
Clause scrutiny. Whether a government social worker who preaches to their clients is treated as
government proselytization or government-endorsed proselytization, it violates the Establishment
Clause. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing cases where government-sponsored
private speech violated the Establishment Clause). Whatever its shortcomings in the speech
context, the pursuant to official duties question is important in the religion context. As for the
Pickering balancing inquiry, the government's interests in regulating speech and religion are more
or less the same. (The one difference is that Establishment concerns would be more prominent
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earlier, readily translate from speech to religion.278 Speech is expressive, and
therefore capable of conveying a message about a matter of public interest.
Conduct is not necessarily expressive, and consequently it is odd to require
that a particular act enable the free flow of information on a matter of public
interest. Eliminating this threshold means that so long as the religious
exercise is not pursuant to official duties, all religion claims would be subject
to the Pickering balancing. The result would be a workable government
employee religion test that to some extent mirrors the one for speech.
It is not a perfect solution. The problem is not an impending deluge of
claims. Eliminating the public concern requirement for religion claims does
not invite a floodgates problem (as eliminating it for speech claims might) 279
since adverse employment actions are much more likely to feature speech
compared to religion.
However, the public concern inquiry signaled that promoting personal
autonomy was not of First Amendment interest in the government employee
context. Eliminating it for government employee religion but not government
employee speech raises the question of why autonomy is constitutionally
protected for one but not the other.28 0 After all, just as the public concern
requirement potentially denies constitutional protection for harmless,
nondisruptive religious practices, so too it denies protection for harmless,
nondisruptive speech.28 ' (Indeed a separate complaint made about the
government employee speech doctrine, though not one often made, is that the
for religion claims.) And since the balancing is so fact-specific to begin with, slight differences
in the equation ought not defeat the act of balancing itself. Thus, the first and third steps of
government employee speech make sense for government employee religion.
278. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
279. Estlund, supra note 240, at 1476 ("The fear of opening the floodgates of litigation is
based on the potential number of lawsuits as well as the burden of each one.... The number of
potential disputes over speech alone is mind boggling.").
280. Toni M. Massaro, Nuts and Seeds: Mitigating Third-Party Harms of Religious
Exemptions, Post-Hobby Lobby, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 350-51 (2015) ("Government respect
for religious freedom is a legitimate, even compelling, reason for granting an exemption to
religious speakers in some cases; but this should not teeter into a form of religious exceptionalism
that undermines the neutrality demands central to freedom of speech. A Jehovah's Witness has
an equal, not superior, right to excusal from a mandatory flag salute, even if she explains that the
requirement burdens both her religious freedom and speech autonomy, and nothing in
constitutional law supports a claim that the former is a categorically heavier imposition on
individual liberty than is the latter." (footnote omitted)).
281. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the
Public Concern Requirement, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1988) ("This [matter of public
concern] threshold, however, may be overbroad and thus fail to protect constitutionally speech
that does not affect the government's ability to exercise its managerial function.").
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public concern requirement ignores the personal autonomy justification for
free speech. 28 2)
Some might respond that individual283 religious practice promotes
something in addition to autonomy that speech does not.284 But if this claim
depends on a view of religious truth, such as God's will, then it is
unpersuasive to anyone who does not share that subjective view.2 85 Others
might respond that the autonomy interests in religion are different in strength
or kind than they are for speech.2 86 Perhaps. The argument that the stakes are
282. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 121, 127 (1996) ("The right to free speech includes 'the need of many men to express their
opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth living' and comports 'with the premise of
individual dignity and choice.' Conversely, the application of a 'public concern' threshold to
preclude First Amendment protection, rather than safeguard free speech in the context of public
employment, goes against the Supreme Court's own precedents and ignores an essential aspect
of the First Amendment." (footnote omitted)); see Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in
Public Sector Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 597, 650 (1986) ("The holding of Connick would have been different under a self-
development theory.").
Another alternative-dropping the public concern requirement for both religion and speech-
might not be desirable or feasible. Most free speech scholars are far more keen to eliminate the
pursuant to official duties threshold than the matter of public concern one. It is certainly not sought
by those who believe that facilitating political deliberation rather than promoting individual
autonomy is the main goal of the Free Speech Clause. Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due
Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247,
253 n. 15, 254 (2005) (listing Alexander Meiklejohn, Owen Fiss, and Cass Sunstein as proponents
of public rights theory, where "the central purpose of the Free Speech Clause is to ensure that
members of the political community receive the information they need to make informed
decisions about matters of public policy"). Others may agree that autonomy justification is an
important component of free speech, yet question whether government employees should enjoy
more constitutional protection than private employees-save when they are providing the public
with valuable insight on government operations. As a practical matter, eliminating the public
concern requirement invites a floodgate problem. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. In
any event, the focus on this Article is not reworking the government employee speech doctrine,
but developing a government employee religion doctrine.
283. Again, the question is about individual religious practice as opposed to institutional
religious practice. The question is whether individual religious practice promotes something,
other than individual autonomy, that individual speech does not.
284. Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1365
(2012) ("The explicitly religious premise of this argument is that God, or some transcendent
authority, has imposed duties on mankind and that fulfillment of those duties takes priority over
complying with positive law.").
285. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
286. See Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs ofFree Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 184 (2002) ("As an abstract proposition, it
is a mistake to characterize religion as speech because doing so undermines our commitment to
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graver since religious observers act out of a sense of obligation 287 fails to
consider that people also speak out of a sense of obligation.2 88 Similarly, the
argument that the autonomy interest in religion differs because religion is a
component of identity in a way speech is not does not describe all religions
or all speech. 289 Both arguments touch on the perennial question of whether
religion is special.290 I do not intend to settle the question here, either in its
religion as a whole permutation or in its individual religious practice
permutation, but note that the answer will influence which version of
government employee religion doctrine seems preferable.
However, any different treatment of speech and religion raises a potential
free speech problem. A cornerstone of free speech jurisprudence is that the
government may not favor some viewpoints over others.29' In fact, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the government violates the Free
Speech Clause when it treats religious viewpoints differently. For example,
once a school board granted social and civic groups after-hour access to its
school buildings, the Court ruled that the Free Speech Clause demanded that
the idea that there is something unique and distinctive about religion in life and in constitutional
law.").
287. Schwartzman, supra note 284, at 1366 (explaining but not endorsing the argument that
"religious people experience psychological harms that differ in kind from those without a sense
of obligation to a transcendent power").
288. William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression,
67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 587 (1983) ("The critical element in preventing psychic harm is assessing
the strength of the conscientiously held belief Although traditional religious beliefs may be
motivated by a strong conscience, the same may be said of most moral beliefs."); see Shiffrin,
supra note 129, at 26 ("To force someone to do what he is obliged not to do is especially cruel,
regardless of the consequences he fears."). Moreover, not every religious observer acts pursuant
to a mandate. Perhaps the assumption is that the religious observer is almost always acting out of
obligation in a way a secular speaker almost never is.
289. For example, motherhood or fatherhood may be a crucial element of identity, as much
if not more than religion, so that speech about parenting can also be described as speech about a
central component of identity. Then again, perhaps the assumption is that religious practice is
always, or almost always, related to identity in a way that speech rarely is.
290. Compare Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 571, 574 ("Because religion is a distinctive human good, accommodation of religion
as such is not unfair."), and Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000), with Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 262, at 1315, and Schwartzman,
supra note 284, at 1355 ("Many of the most widely held normative justifications for favoring (or
disfavoring) religion are prone to predictable forms of internal incoherence.").
291. So strong is this prohibition that it applies even to speech normally considered outside
the First Amendment's protection. In R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that the ban against viewpoint discrimination applies to "fighting words," a category
of speech that can be outlawed altogether. Id. at 386.
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it grant religious groups equal access.29 2 Similarly, if a state university funds
student activities, then under the Free Speech Clause it must fund the student
religious paper on an equal basis. 293 To do otherwise would discriminate
against religious viewpoints. Yet subjecting religious claims to a less
demanding test seems to favor the religious viewpoint, thereby breaking the
free speech commandment against viewpoint favoritism. 294
Viewpoint discrimination, a cardinal sin in free speech, might be averted
if the religious expression claims are separated out from the religious conduct
claims. 295 Religion claims that implicate the Free Speech Clause because they
have an expressive component would be subject to the same requirements as
any other free speech claim. 2 96 Religious claims without a speech component
would not have to pass the public concern threshold. Nevertheless, treating
religion claims with a speech component differently than religion claims
without one 29 7 leads to the unusual situation of less constitutional protection
for religious speech than religious conduct (whereas usually it is the
opposite). 2 98 Also, it does not fully respond to the criticism that religious
autonomy seems favored over speech autonomy. Of course, the alternative,
keeping the public concern test for all government employee claims, remains.
292. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (holding that school
violated free speech rights of Christian Good News Club when it failed to provide the Club the
same after-hours access as other clubs); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) ("[I]t discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property
to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those
dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.").
293. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) ("We
conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb's Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the proper way
to interpret the University's objections to Wide Awake [the evangelical student newspaper].");
see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (In refusing to recognize religious student
group, "UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to
use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion.").
294. Massaro, supra note 280, at 350 ("In the freedom of speech context, religious speakers
receive no more or less protection than other actors who speak from other perspectives.").
295. Because conduct with no expressive component does not implicate the Free Speech
Clause, it does not raise viewpoint discrimination problems.
296. Moreover, since religious viewpoints are generally held to be on a matter of public
concern, they would probably survive that threshold inquiry.
297. To allow the plaintiff with a religious speech claim to bring a speech claim and a religion
claim would essentially reinstate the favored status of religious viewpoints, since only religious
speech claims (in the guise of a religion claim) would be exempt from the public concern
threshold.
298. Conduct without any expressive component is not subject to any free speech heightened
scrutiny, whereas expressive conduct and pure speech are subject to heightened scrutiny. The idea
is that conduct is more likely to cause harm than speech, and therefore less justification is needed
to regulate it.
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Government employee religion and speech need not be exactly the same
in order to apply parallel doctrine. Nevertheless, they have a great deal in
common. The government interests are identical. Moreover, the employee's
autonomy-based interests overlap if not completely, then to a great degree. In
any event, the goal of this Article is not to argue that the public employee
speech doctrine be adopted "as is." The goal is, rather, to argue that
government employee speech doctrine should serve as a model and to explore
what a government employee religion doctrine might look like. The exact test
one prefers would depend on, among other things, one's view of the
distinctiveness of religion.
CONCLUSION
The speech and religion claims of government employees are very similar.
Consequently, it makes sense to base government employee religion doctrine
on government employee speech doctrine.299 Moreover, the fact that the
accountability problem-the main shortcoming of the government employee
speech doctrine-does not arise in the government employee religion context
reinforces the argument that the existing doctrine is appropriate for
government employee religion.
Unless the government speech model is rejected completely, government
employees who refuse to perform their assigned tasks will not have a religion
claim. Since their act (or refusal to act) is pursuant to official duties, it is
attributable to the state and therefore not protected by the Constitution.3 00 In
contrast, a claim involving a government employee's desire to wear religious
garb, which is not part of their official duties, would have a much better
chance of succeeding. If expressive, it would express a religious viewpoint,
which the Supreme Court has held to be a matter of public concern.
Moreover, in most situations, what a person wears does not disrupt the
workplace, though it is impossible to generalize about the outcome of the
fact-intensive Pickering balance. Finally, although the doctrine itself is a
constitutional doctrine, the concerns it reflects should inform a statutory
RFRA claim.
299. In fact, the pursuant to official duties query highlights that a government employee's
acts and speech are not purely private and may actually be attributable to state, thereby triggering
the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.
300. The one possible exception is a religious refusal that is accommodated behind the scenes
without the public knowledge. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
